The British War Office ;: from the Crimean War to Cardwell, 1855-1868. by Harpin, Paul H.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1976
The British War Office ;: from the Crimean War to
Cardwell, 1855-1868.
Paul H. Harpin
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Harpin, Paul H., "The British War Office ;: from the Crimean War to Cardwell, 1855-1868." (1976). Masters Theses 1911 - February
2014. 1592.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/1592

THE BRITISH WAR OFFICE:
FROM THE CRIMEAN WAR TO CARDWELL, 1855-1868
A Thesis Presented
by
Paul H. Harpin
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
Ifillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF ARTS
May 19 76
History
THE BRITISH WAR OFFICE:
FROM THE CRIMEAN WAR TO CARDWELL
, 1855-1868
A Thesis
by
Paul H. Harpin
Approved as to style and content by:
Harold J. Gordon, Jr. , Chairmakyof Committee
Franklin B. Wickv/lre, Member
Mary B. Wickwire , Member
Gerald W. McFarland, Department Head
History Department
May 1976
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE iv
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. INEFFICIENCY, NEGLIGENCE AND THE
CRIMEAN WAR 7
III. REORGANIZATION 1855-1860
. 27
General 27
Correspondence and the Conduct of
Business within the War Office 37
Civil-Military Relations 4 9
Armaments and Artillery Administration .... 53
Engineers 57
Clothing 61
Armaments Manufacture 64
The Accountant General's Office 71
Commissariat * 75
Conclusion 81
IV. CONFUSION AND CHANGE, 1861-1868 85
V. FINAL WORDS 104
APPENDICES 109
BIBLIOGRAPHY 113
t
• • •ill
PREFACE
My purpose in writing this paper is to fill a gap.
The literature of British Military History is filled with
the exploits of various figures and armies, but comparatively
little has been done in the field of Army administration at
the executive or War Office level. Furthermore, with the
exception of a few contemporary writers, the limited number
of historians of Army administration tend to concentrate on
Cardwell and the post-Cardwell era, emphasizing, not without
justification, the abolition of purchase and the adoption
of the General Staff concept. The formative years of War
Office reform following the Crimean War are ofttimes barely
mentioned at all. Hampden Gordon, the author of The War
Office, the only work which deals with the whole of War Office
history, spends only six pages (out of 331) on the period
1855-68, while he uses nearly 250 pages for the period 1904-
19. This leaves a gap in the story of the War Office, and an
important one, for during the years immediately following the
Crimean War, the War Office underwent the most significant
changes in its development. Most major historians of nine-
teenth-century Army administration, including Robert Biddulph,
Brian Bond, W.S. Hamer, and even J.W. Fortescue h a, in
differing degrees, either directed their emphasis sewhere
or downplayed the importance of immediate post-C >n War
iv
Vchanges, or both. An exception is Correlli Barnett, who in
'
his Britain and Her Army 1509-1970 recognized the importance
of these changes but did not examine them in any depth.
In my attempt to fill this gap, I have examined in
depth the period 1855-68 with an emphasis on the reorganization
of 18 55. In looking at the changes made during this period,
I have strived to determine what they actually did and what
their impact was in terms of an improved efficiency, whether
or not they solved the problems they were designed to solve
and if the changes themselves created new problems.
For reasons of time and space I have limited myself
to an examination of major departments or branches in the
War Office itself, especially those involved in controversy
and to the crucial manufacturing' departments at Woolwich and
elsewhere. My examination has concentrated on departmental
functions and duties, the conduct of their business and
problem areas. Moreover, I have devoted a considerable amounr.
of attention to the area of the relationship between the
t
Secretary of State for War and the Commander in Chief, which
is so important to an understanding of this period.
Because of a lack of time, space and, most importantly,
available research material, I have had to eliminate certain
aspects of War Office operations from inclusion in this inquiry.
Most important among these are the militia, military educa-
tion (Brian Bond has done a masterful job in this area)
,
administration of the Army in India and the internal workings
vi
of the Commander in Chief's office. However, the exclusion '
of these aspects of War Office operations has in no way
affected the course of my inquiry
.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
As depicted by Hampden Gordon in his classic, The
War Office
,
the British Army had been used in the seventeenth-
century as an instrument of despotism and "an engine of
tyranny" by Charles I and was consequently disbanded by
Parliament at the Restoration because of Parliament's fear
that the Army could once again be used against it.''" Never-
theless, Parliament allowed Charles II to maintain four regi-
ments of personal guards. These guards were soon reinforced
in 1661 in order to maintain public order in the face of an
armed uprising against the King led by a man named Venner.
This reinforcement of the guards subsequently became permanent
and a small standing army, which numbered 8452 men in 1663,
2
came into existence.
A series of acts including the Mutiny Act of 1689 and
the Bill of Rights of 1689 established a new system (which
continued into the twentieth century) in which no British
Army could exist without the consent of Parliament, which also
voted its funds. Parliamentary consent had to be renewed
annually; therefore, even though the government, command and
1Hampden Gordon, The War Office (London: Putnam, 1935),
p. 24.
2Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970
(London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970), pp. 113-15.
1
2discipline of the Army fell within the royal prerogative, the
annual renewal of Parliament's consent was necessary for the
Army's maintenance. Furthermore, for the next two hundred
years or so, the methods by which the prerogative was exercised
were changed, although the prerogative itself was not neces-
sarily altered. Parliament gradually encroached upon the royal
authority and, in many cases, the exercise of authority went
from representatives of the Crown not responsible to Parliament
to ministers who were responsible to Parliament. 4
Although the history of this process begins in the late
eighteenth-century, it is necessary to go back to 1661 in order
to gain a full appreciation of it. In that year, a royal
appointee, the Secretary at War, became the private secretary
to the Commander in Chief of the^Army. In 1670, the Secretary
at War became an official clerk to the King and became responsi-
ble for preparing and countersigning royal orders relating to
certain administrative needs of the forces. As the King
himself became the Commander in Chief that same year, the
Secretary at War's post increased in scope and importance
especially as there was no Secretary of State specifically
charged with military affairs. As advisor to the Crown, the
Secretary at War controlled all matters bearing on Army finance,
3Gordon, The War Office , pp. 26-27. The royal pre-
rogative included certain powers in relation to the Army which
belonged to the traditional rights of the Sovereign. (Gordon,
The War Office , p. 20).
4 Ibid.
,
p. 28.
3the relations of the Army to the civil community and the general
government of the Army. He spoke on military affairs in the
House of Commons but was not responsible to Parliament. Even-
tually though, his power and influence came to be controlled
to a certain extent by Parliamentary action. As military
expenditures increased in the eighteenth-century, Parliament's
desire to control it grew accordingly. The Act of Economical
Reform (1782-83) consequently made the Secretary at War respon-
sible to Parliament and charged him with controlling the
expenditure of the Army instead of merely announcing what
amounts were required, as before. ~*
The Secretary at War's independent authority was
further eroded by the fact that, as the war with France led
to a revival of the post of Commander in Chief in 1793, the
communication of the royal pleasure was no longer the function
of the Secretary at War. The King gave up the personal command
of the Army which he had held since 1670 and the royal plea-
sure in matters relating to the internal discipline and
regulation of the Army, including promotions, was henceforth
communicated by the Commander in Chief.
In addition, the introduction of a Secretary of State
for War in 1794 further complicated matters for the Secretary
at War and indicated increased Parliamentary desire for more
5 Ibid., pp. 16-18 and 38-40.
6 Ibid., p. 40.
4control in the affairs of the Army. The appointment of the '
Secretary of State for War placed the general policy of the
governing of the Army in the hands of a civilian person who
held an office of the highest rank and who was responsible
to Parliament. He was responsible for military policy,
military strength and the conduct of operations. Prior to
this appointment, with the exception of the Secretary at War
in financial affairs, no one in the Army hierarchy had been
directly accountable to Parliament because the command, govern-
ment and disposition of the Army were included in the royal
prerogative. Up until the late eighteenth-century, Parliament
had tended to shy away from close association with the military
forces because of its traditional fear of a standing army.
Parliament felt that its check upon the finances of the Army
prevented abuse of royal power and that if the military and
civilian elements were united in the administration of the
Army, the military would dominate and Parliament's check
7
would be lost.
The Secretary of State for War had no authority in
regard to the exercise of the royal prerogative. The pre-
rogative had been and was exercised variously by the Secretary
at War and the Commander in Chief, each independent of the
other, and who struggled between themselves for control of the
Army. Meanwhile, the Secretary of State for War, with only
7 Ibid., pp. 40-41 and W.S. Hamer, The British Army:
Civil-Military Relations, 1885-1905 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1970)
,
p. 6.
5vaguely defined powers, soon receded into the background. In
fact, his status and power with regard to the Army decreased
so much that in 1801 he assumed charge of the Colonies in
addition to his other duties. 8
The conflict between the Commander in Chief and the
Secretary at War, who, despite the erosion of his former
authority, remained greatly influential because of his con-
tinued control of the Army's purse strings, represented another
issue making itself known as Parliament gradually encroached
upon the royal authority over the Army. This issue was that
of military resentment at, and resistance to civilian intru-
sion in the administration of the Army. The officer corps,
steeped in tradition, was unwilling to accept changes it
considered detrimental to the best interests of the Army, the
9Crown and the country. The soldiers therefore wanted to
retain the special connection of the Army with the Monarchy
in order to protect the appointments, promotions and disci-
pline of the Army from political interference
.
Gordon, The War Office , p. 41. The incumbent was hence-
forth referred to as the Secretary of State for War and the
Colonies
.
9Hamer, Civil-Military Relations , pp. x and 67.
10 Ibid.
,
p. 6. The soldiers also opposed any civilian-
initiated reform which might upset their privileged position.
Army officers, mostly the sons of landed and propertied classes,
according to Hamer reflected in their customs and habits "the
tone and quality of the society from whence . . . [they] came."
The regimental mess was an exclusive private club where, again
according to Hamer, "by rigid class distinction and a well-
defined ritual, the social attitudes proper to an officer-gentle
man and the traditions of the regiment were zealously main-
6Because the civilian and military elements had remained
separate and relatively independent before the Crimean War,
the issue of civil-military relations had remained dormant for
the most part. 11 However, the issue came to the surface with
the reorganization of the War Office in 1855 which occurred as
the result of adverse public opinion over early setbacks in
the Crimean War. The reorganization placed the military
directly under the authority of the civilian Secretary of State
for War and led to conflict between the civil and military
elements over the question of control of the Army and over
12the encroachment of civil authorities into military affairs
.
tained. 11 Polo ponies, hounds, fine crystal, expensive silver,
wine cellars, private bands and theatricals were all character-
istic of regimental messes. (Hamer, Civil-Military Relations ,
pp. 14-15)
.
"^Ibid.
, p. 5
.
Purchase of commissions was also a heated issue, but
is dealt with only peripherally in this inquiry as I feel that
a detailed discussion would only detract from the main concern
and would not appreciably add to an understanding of the opera-
tion of the War Office itself.
CHAPTER II
INEFFICIENCY, NEGLIGENCE AND THE CRIMEAN WAR
On the eve of the Crimean War, the Army was adminis-
tered by a number of separate, distinct and mutually inde-
pendent authorities who communicated with each other by letter
and who were connected only by their common subordination to
the Government."^"
The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, a
Cabinet officer, was responsible for submitting to the Crown
the Cabinet's determination of the size of the force to be
maintained and for making known to the Commander in Chief of
the Army the establishment thus decided upon. He was also
responsible for the allocation of garrisons to Colonial pos-
sessions, for the conveyance of the Government's orders to
the officers commanding abroad and, in wartime, for the
selection of officers to command in chief and for the control
» 2
of operations bearing on the conduct of the war.
Another Cabinet officer, the Home Secretary, was
See Appendix A for a listing of these authorities and
their duties.
Great Britain, Parliament, Report of the Commissioners
Appointed to Inquire Into the Practicability of Consolidating
the Different Departments Connected with the Civil Administration
of the Army. Military and Naval Parliamentary Paper, Vol. 4
(Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971 [originally
published 1837]), p. 13. Hereinafter referred to as 1837
Report on Civil Administration of the Army.
7
8responsible for the militia, for the geographical distribu-
tion of the Army at home (in consultation with the Commander
in Chief) and for general military questions relating to
3Great Britain.
The Secretary at War, a junior, non-Cabinet member
of the Government, held a seat in Parliament and was responsible
to Parliament for everything relating to the finance of the
Army and to the contact of the Army with the civil popula-
tion. In regard to the former function, he prepared and sub-
mitted the annual Army Estimates to Parliament and checked
and controlled the details of military expenditure. However,
even though he prepared and submitted the Army Estimates to
Parliament, he did not determine the size of the force to be
maintained, which, in itself, was- the very foundation of the
Estimates. Furthermore, although he could prevent the Army
or any portion of it from moving (which entailed expense) , he
could not move it on his own volition. He also lacked control
over the Artillery and the Engineers and over the arms and
supplies of the Army. In regard to the contact of the Army
with the civil population, he held responsibility for the pro-
tection of civil subjects against oppression and misconduct by
3The militia had been abolished shortly after the
Napoleonic Wars and was revived in 1852. The disembodied (in-
active) militia was under the Home Secretary. A committee m
the House of Commons prepared the Militia Estimates while the
Secretary at War dealt with all questions of finance and internal
arrangements of the regiments. (General Sir Robert Biddulph,
Lord Cardwell at the War Office [London: John Murray, 1904J,
p. 7).
9the Army, Accordingly, his sanction and authority were
required in such matters as quartering, billeting and
marching of troops, which brought soldiers into contact
with civilians.^
Notwithstanding the limitations on him, the Secretary
at War, who in theory had little influence, was in practice
all but supreme. This predominance was because of his
control of the Army's finances and because he had become,
in practice, the person in Parliament who answered questions
dealing with the administration and the discipline of the
Army. The Secretary at War could thus interfere in the
internal affairs of the Army and in the affairs of the
5
various other administrative authorities as well
.
The Commander in Chief was a military officer sub-
ordinate, in theory, only to the Crown. He was responsible
for the discipline and the efficiency of the Cavalry and the
Biddulph, Lord Cardwell , pp. 4-5; 1837 Report on
Civil Administration of the Army , pp. 14 and 16-17; and G.R.
Gleig, "Reform of the War Department," Edinburgh Review ,
October, 1954, p. 276. Gleig had been appointed Chaplain
General by Sidney Herbert when Herbert was Secretary at War
(1844-46) . Gleig retained this office through the reorganiza-
tion and was also a well-known military biographer. (See
Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College , 1854-
1914 [London: Eyre Methuen, 1972], p. 57).
5 1837 Report on Civil Administration of the Army , p. 14;
Gleig, "War Departments," p. 276; and testimony of Lord Pan-
mure, a former Secretary at War, Great Britain, Parliament,
Report from the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expendi
-
ture . Military and Naval Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 5 (Shannon,
Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971 [originally published
I860]), p. 74. Hereinafter referred to as 1860 Report on
Military Organization.
10
Infantry, the enlistment of their soldiers, the commissioning
and promotion of their officers, (subject to the sanction of
the Monarch) and for recommending to the Sovereign the officers
who were to be entrusted with commands, subject always to the
previous approval of the Home Secretary for forces in the
British Isles and the Secretary of State for War and the
Colonies for foreign and Colonial commands. The Commander in
Chief also commanded the forces at home, but his authority was
limited to troops in Great Britain and Ireland. He had control
neither over troops abroad nor over the supply of arms and
stores, fortifications, the Artillery and the Engineers.
Furthermore, he could not order the movement of troops without
the previous sanction of the Secretary at War.
Another major administrative authority, the Board of
Ordnance, was subordinate to the Government and consisted of
the Master General of Ordnance, the Board's head and a military
officer of high rank, the Surveyor General, the Clerk of Ordnance
and the Principal Storekeeper. The Board was responsible for
t
the so-called civil duties of the Ordnance Department. These
duties included the provision of all arms and military stores
of every description, the preparation and submission of the
6Gordon, The War Office , p. 50 and Biddulph, Lord
Cardwell
,
p. 3. The Commander in Chief had three principal
assistants : the Military Secretary who was responsible mainly
for correspondence, the Adjutant General who was responsible
mainly for the personnel aspects of the Army (e.g., recruiting,
discipline, etc.) and the Quartermaster-General who was res-
ponsible mainly for logistics and the movement of the Army.
(Barnett, Britain and Her Army , p. 240; Bond, Staff College, p.
12; and Hamer, Civil-Military Relations, p. 12).
11
Ordnance Estimates to Parliament, the clothing of the Artillery
and Engineers, the construction and repair of fortifications,
military works and barracks, and the supply of fuel, light,
miscellaneous articles, provisions and forage for troops in
Great Britain and Ireland. 7
The Master General of Ordnance directed the Artillery
and Engineers in all matters of discipline, pay and allowances,
appointments, promotions and orders regarding their employment. 8
This responsibility constituted the military function of the
Ordnance Department and lay entirely in the hands of the
Master General of Ordnance. The Master General was assisted
by the Inspector General of Fortifications, a military officer
of high rank, and by the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal
Engineers. The Inspector General of Fortifications advised on
questions of works and buildings in the charge of the Royal
Engineers and supervised Engineer employment. The Deputy
Adjutant General, Royal Engineers, administered the discipline
of the Corps. In his artillery responsibilities, the Master
General was assisted by the Deputy Adjutant General of Artillery
who administered the discipline of the Royal Artillery and by
7Gordon, The War Office
, pp. 14-15; Biddulph, Lord
Cardwell
, p. 6; and 1837 Report on Civil Administration of the
Army
, pp. 14-15.
o
Appointments in the Artillery and Engineers were
entirely at the discretion of the Master General of Ordnance
and were not subject to purchase as were those in the Infantry
and Cavalry. (Testimony of General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, the
Inspector General of Fortifications since 1845, 1860 Report on
Military Organization
, p. 264).
12
the Director General of Artillery who was in charge of
armaments and ammunition and who advised on scientific ques-
tions and dealt with experiments and new patterns or arms. Al
though the Board of Ordnance as a whole was responsible for
the superintendence of the so-called civil duties of the
Ordnance Department, the Master General of Ordnance ruled
9supreme in all matters.
The supply of provisions, fuel and light, forage,
transport and money to the troops abroad was the responsi-
bility of the Commissariat Department, under the management
of the Treasury. 10 The Colonels of the several regiments
provided clothing for the Infantry and the Cavalry and the
inspection of this clothing was the responsibility of the
Board of General Officers.''""'" The one remaining major adminis-
9Biddulph , Lord Cardwell
, pp . 6-7 ; 18 37 Report on
Civil Administration of the Army
, p. 15; and testimony of
Colonel W.F.D. Jervois, a member of the Royal Engineers since
18 39/ Great Britain , Parliament
,
Reports of a Committee Appointed
to Inquire Into the Arrangements in Force For the Conduct of
Business in the Army Departments
.
Military and Naval Parlia-
mentary Papers , Vol. 4 (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press,
1971 [originally published 1870])/ p. 430. Hereinafter refer-
red to as 1870 Report on the Army Departments .
10Testimony of John William Smith, the Commissary-
General in Chief, 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 268
and Biddulph, Lord Cardwell
, p. 6. The Treasury prepared the
Annual Estimates of the Commissariat which were entirely dis-
tinct from the Army Estimates and the Ordnance Estimates. (Great
Britain , Parliament
,
Report from the Select Committee on Army
and Ordnance Expenditure . Military and Naval Parliamentary
Papers, Vol. 4 [Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971
(originally published 1851)], p. 254).
Gordon, The War Office , p. 50 and Biddulph, Lord
Cardwell
,
p. 7.
trative body, the Medical Department, provided medical stores
1
2
and medical personnel.
This brief description alone demonstrates the un-
wieldiness and inefficiency of the system of Army adminis-
tration. The Army served several independent masters at the
same time, and no intermediary body co-ordinated the functions,
orders and activities of the several authorities with each
other and with the Army itself. The Artillery and Engineers
alone in the Army had complete unity in their administration,
serving as they did under the sole management of the Master
General of Ordnance. The Cavalry and Infantry came under the
Commander in Chief for discipline and efficiency, the Board
of General Officers for clothing, the Secretary at War for
matters of a financial nature, the Board of Ordnance for sup-
plies and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies for
operations abroad. The Medical Department also had five
immediate superiors: the Secretary of State for War and the
Colonies, the Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief (for
discipline) , the Master General of Ordnance and the Board of
_ - 13Ordnance.
Such a system resulted in a great deal of conflict of
12Gordon, The War Office , p. 50.
13Testimony of Andrew Smith, the Director General of
the Medical Department since 1853, Report from the Select
Committee on Medical Department (Army) (1856, Vol. XIII, p.
359), p. 374. Hereinafter referred to as 1856 Medical Depart-
ment
.
14
interest, multiplication of correspondence and needless con-'
fusion in the transaction of business. For example, with the
previous sanction of the Crown and the Colonial Minister, the
Commander in Chief could assemble and send abroad a force of
infantry and cavalry but he could not command any artillery
and engineer support for it. For that he depended upon the
Master General of Ordnance. Meanwhile, the Secretary at War
could stop the entire operation by withholding necessary funds.
The arming of the force, let alone the entire Army, depended
14
on the Board of Ordnance.
The procedure necessary to issue arms to the Infantry
and Cavalry was in itself complicated. The Commander in Chief
notified formally the Secretary at War of the requirements for
arms of a regiment. The Secretary at War then wrote to the
Home Secretary requesting him to signify the Crown's pleasure
to the Master General of Ordnance and the Board of Ordnance
for the issuance of the necessary arms. The subsequent letter
by the Home Secretary then became the proper authority for
• 15
furnishing the arms by the Ordnance Department.
A further example of the ponderous procedures of
administration was the method of accomplishing appointments
In fact, a force destined in the Fall of 1854 to
embark for the Crimea was "detained considerably beyond the
stated period" because the Board either neglected or forgot to
give directions for the issuance of rifles to the men. (Gleig,
"War Departments," pp. 277-78).
15 1837 Report on Civil Administration of the Army ,
p. 14.
and promotions in the Infantry and Cavalry. The Commander in
Chief, as mentioned above, took the Crown's pleasure in this
sphere. He prepared a memorandum containing names approved
by him which he forwarded to the Secretary at War. The
Secretary at War then extracted the names from the memorandum
and prepared two lists, one containing names for regiments
serving abroad, the other for those serving at home. The
former list went to the Secretary of State for War and the
Colonies and the latter to the Home Secretary. These ministers
then prepared the commissions and forwarded them to the Sover-
eign for signature. The commissions were then returned to the
appropriate minister for countersignature."^
This then was the situation in Army administration on
the eve of the Crimean War--the first large-scale war the
British Army had been called upon to fight since Waterloo.
The system of Army administration, virtually the same as that
of 1815 and allowed to languish since then, was now put to a
severe test.
The British Army was totally unprepared to wage war
on a continental scale. Since Waterloo, Britain's island po-
sition and her Empire had been protected by her strong Navy.
The Army had acted merely as a reasonably effective police
force capable of dealing with disturbances within the British
16 Ibid., p. 13. See also the testimony of Sir Benja-
min Hawes, the Permanent Under Secretary of State, 1860 Report
on Military Organization, pp. 157 and 161.
Empire. The Army's only enemies had for the most part been
undisciplined and ill-equipped and Parliament had seen no
need for modernization or reform in either administration or
organization. Consequently, during the forty years of
relative peace since Waterloo, Parliament had been reluctant
to vote funds for the Army and had allowed many important
military institutions to degenerate. In the words of his-
torian Correlli Barnett: "War became a noise far away. The
national sense of danger, the sense of struggle between
1
8
nations, was atrophied."
As long as the Army Estimates had remained low, the
Army had been ignored. Thus, at the outset of the Crimean
War, all preparations for large-scale warfare had to start
from scratch. The several authorities at the head of the
Army immediately set to work at preparing the Army to fight;
unfortunately, their actions were neither co-ordinated nor
synchronized. It was, as G.R. Gleig states, "physically im-
possible for so many different departments to give the
necessary impulse at the same moment to each separate part
of a machine so complicated and yet so homogeneous as an Army."
17John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and
British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916 (New York: John Wiley &
Sons , 1974 ) , pp. 1-2
.
18Barnett, Britain and Her Army , p. 273.
19Gleig, "War Departments," p. 279. See also, G.M.
Trevelyan, History of England , Vol. Ill (Garden City, N.J.:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), p. 198.
17
It was much easier and quicker for the Commander in '
Chief to assemble and ship a force of infantry and cavalry,
along with artillery provided by the Master General of Ordnance,
than it was for the Commissariat to provide food and land trans-
port. Furthermore, the Commissariat had virtually lain dor-
mant since 1815, because the supply of food and forage at
home was a Board of Ordnance responsibility and because trans-
port at home was mostly by railroad, not by horseback. Un-
fortunately, Commissariat operations during colonial wars of
the past forty years had scarcely provided the expertise and
organization necessary for the impending large-scale opera-
tions. In addition, the organization used by Wellington for
land transport, the Waggon Train, had disbanded in the inter-
est of economy after 1815. Therefore, at the time of the
Crimean War, no nucleus organization for land transport even
existed, forcing the Commissariat to improvise from the start.
The Commissariat was thus left behind in the race of authority
against authority with each hurrying the employment of his
t
charges so that the several elements necessary to render the
20
Army effective arrived piecemeal in the Crimea.
The result was that at the time of the British in-
vasion of the Crimea, the army in the field was deficient in
transport, baggage animals and supplies of all kinds, inclu-
ding medicines. When the British landed at Calamita Bay on
20Gleig, "War Departments," p. 279.
18
September 14, 1854, they had no base and no idea of the nature
of the country ahead of them—the only reconnaissance of the
Crimea having been made at sea from a distance. Furthermore,
they had neither ambulances, litters nor food. 21 As Cecil
Woodham-Smith states: "all was flung on the known, the extra-
ordinary fighting quality of British troops. The quality of
the troops would compensate for everything." 22 Compensate
they eventually did, but at the cost of 25,000 British lives,
many of them sacrificed needlessly as the result of the in-
efficiency of the existing system of Army administration and
of the absence of any reform of it during the forty year inter-
val after Waterloo.
On June 12 , 1854 , the Queen appointed the Duke of
Newcastle Secretary of State for War, thus separating the old
designation of Secretary of State for War and the Colonies into
two distinct Cabinet positions. The only actual change, how-
ever, was the separation of colonial and military duties. No
23increased powers went to the new minister. Also, he had no
separate office for his department and no mandate describing
his new position. Furthermore, as the previous office had been
21Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: E.P.
Dutton & Co., Inc., 1860), p. 169.
22Ibid., p. 136.
Reports from Committees: Army Before Sebastopol (1854-
55, Vol. IX) 3d Report, Vol. IX, pt. 2, p. 109. Hereinafter
referred to as 3d Report ABS .
19
overwhelmingly preoccupied with colonial affairs, no prece- '
dents existed to guide the new Secretary of State. His Under
Secretaries were also new to their work; thus, he had no
experienced aides. Consequently, the minister himself soon
became preoccupied with matters of detail while matters of
"paramount importance" were postponed. 24
In order to direct the war, the Secretary of State for
War corresponded separately with several authorities. He com-
municated with the Commander in Chief on matters relating to
the movement of the Cavalry and the Infantry, with the Master
General of Ordnance regarding the movement of the Artillery
and the Engineers, with the Treasury about the Commissariat
and with the Board of Ordnance concerning military supplies.
The major stumbling block, however, was the fact that the Com-
missariat was a separate department under the Treasury and
was not subordinate to the Secretary of State for War in war-
time as were the military departments.
In his communications with the Commissariat, the Duke
of Newcastle explained the Army's intentions and the number
of men to be supplied. He did not interfere with the depart-
ment to any extent afterward, as he "expected them to carry
out the necessary arrangements for . . . provisions and
2 6transport." In addition, the Commissariat did not report
O A
Reports from Committees: Army Before Sebastopol (18 54
55, Vol. IX) 5th Report, Vol. IX, pt. 3, p. 370. Hereinafter
referred to as 5th Report ABS .
25 3d Report ABS
, pp. 109 and 121.
26
Ibid.
, p. 111.
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officially to the Secretary of State for War who was thus not
officially informed of Commissariat operations. 27
This situation was indeed unfortunate, since it was
the duty of the Commissariat to furnish the army in the field
with provisions, forage and land transport, the lack of which
had much to do with the appalling conditions of the army in
the Crimea.
The British established a camp on the heights before
the Russian fortress of Sevastopol, seven miles from the
nearest British port at Balaclava. Here in 1854-55 the army
was destined to endure unprepared the rigors of winter. As
stated by the Parliamentary Committee which, in 1855, investi-
gated the condition of the army before Sevastopol, the soldiers
were exposed "to all the sufferings and inconveniences of cold,
rain, mud, and snow, on high ground and in the depth of winter.
They suffered from fatigue, exposure, want of clothing, in-
sufficient supplies for the healthy, and imperfect accomodation
2 8for the sick." Another Parliamentary body which, in 1856,
reported on thfe state of supply of the army in the Crimea, con-
cluded that the death rate of the army in the Crimea from 1
October 1854 to 30 April 1855 (approximately 35% of the
average strength of the army present during that period) was
excessive and was "not to be attributed to anything peculiarly
unfavorable in the climate, but to overwork, exposure to wet
27
Ibid., p. 121.
28 5th Report ABS, p. 368.
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and cold, improper food, insufficient clothing during part of
the winter, and insufficient shelter from inclement weather." 29
The supply deficiencies most adversely affecting
the army before Sevastopol were a lack of fresh meat, vege-
tables and bread, fuel, hay and straw and, above all, land
transport, to which many of the other deficiencies may be
attributed. 30 In fact, much of the labor and exposure which
the troops had to undergo owed to the want of sufficient land
31transport. The men themselves were forced to haul supplies
and lived in the open because they could not transport suf-
ficient shelter to their camp. The problem was magnified in
the late Fall of 1854 when climatic conditions turned the one
road between Balaclava and the camp into a virtually impass-
able quagmire. The construction and maintenance of roads was
a responsibility of the Quartermaster-General but the improve-
ment of the road between Balaclava and the camp would have
required manpower beyond the amount available to him. Division
Commanders, however, unanimously insisted that it would have
been impossible to spare a sufficient number of men to repair
the road and carry on military operations at the same time.
Therefore, the only answer to the problem was an increase in
2 9Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supplies
of the British Army in the Crimea (1856, Vol. XX, p. 1), p. 7.
Hereinafter referred to as Supplies in the Crimea .
30u Ibid.
,
p. 10.
31
Ibid.
, p. 7.
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the number of transport animals. 32
The Commissary-General in the Crimea had previously
considered it necessary to have 14,000 pack animals at his
disposal, but in January, 1855, he had only 333 pack horses
and mules and twelve camels. Asked by the Parliamentary Com-
mission on supplies in the Crimea why he had not increased
the number of animals, he replied that he had as many animals
3 3as he could feed. The real cause of the deficiency of land
transport then seemed to have been a shortage of forage, not
a lack of ships or animals. Thus, if the Commissariat had
made proper arrangements beforehand as to forage, the situa-
tion would have been altered to a great extent.
The Commissariat displayed other serious deficiencies
also. The troops were subjected to a diet, which never varied,
of salt meat and biscuit without fresh vegetables. Further-
more, much of what they received was not properly cooked
because of a lack of fuel. Therefore, the men were subject to
scurvy and diseases of the bowels "to an alarming extent."
Virtually all tmedical officers cognizant of the situation
agreed that the continued use of salt meat without fresh
vegetables increased the men's predisposition to disease and
35led to an increased mortality rate.' The Parliamentary
32
Ibid.
, p. 22.
33 Ibid., p. 20.
34 Ibid.
,
p. 21. See also the 5th Report ABS , p. 377. A
Land Transport Corps was later raised to alleviate the transport
problem. Independent of the Commissariat, it remained on active
duty after the war as the Military Train.
Supplies in the Crimea, pp. 10 and 15.
Commission on supplies in the Crimea later determined that a'
fresh meat supply could have been obtained from the south
shore of the Black Sea and brought in available steam and
sail vessels to Balaclava. The Commission concluded that the
Commissary-General in the Crimea was "not then sufficiently
alive to the importance of that article of food" and that
fresh meat might have been, and should have been, supplied
3 6to the army. The Commission reached the same conclusion in
regard to fresh vegetables. The Commissary-General himself
admitted that the army had a sufficient store of rice avail-
able but blamed the lack of land transport for his inability
to supply it to the troops. 37
The lack of land transport also affected the supply
of medical provisions. In fact, not until the middle of
February, 1855, was the camp provided with sufficient medical
3 8
supplies. Unfortunately, lack of supplies was not all that
plagued the treatment of the sick and wounded in the Crimea.
Hospitals were totally inadequate. They were overcrowded, undei
staffed and lacked such basic items as cots, mattresses and
straw to fill what mattresses they did have. The "dreadful
discomfort" of the men and the neglect on the part of the
medical authorities were exemplified by the fact that during
the month of November, 1854, there were approximately 2000
patients in the barrack hospital at Scutari but only six
36
Ibid.
, p. 16
37Ibid., p. 10.
3
^Ibid.
, p. 42
.
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shirts were washed during that entire period. 39 At one point
the average number of patients who died under such conditions
was forty-two out of every one hundred. 40 The performance
and reforming actions of Florence Nightingale to amend these
conditions is legendary.
Supply problems were compounded by the fact that there
was no one person in the Crimea in overall charge of the supply
of the army there. The Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers,
Purveyors (responsible under the Medical Department, for
hospital supplies except medicines)
, the Quartermaster-General
and the Commissariat all had charge of their own stores as
well as specific stores (e.g., food by the Commissariat).
Since no one head co-ordinated supplies, the result was, in
the words of Captain Henry William Gordon, Ordnance Storekeeper
in the Crimea, that "no one knew what stores were with the
army." One department might have deficiencies and another
41
surpluses. Gordon cited as an example the lack of warm
clothing at a time when the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers
and Purveyors Tiad a "superabundance or at any rate a surplus
39 5th Report ABS
, p. 385.
40This figure was later reduced to two out of every
one hundred after improvements were made in conditions. (J.W.
Fortescue, A History of the British Army , Vol XIII [London:
Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1930], p. 156).
41Report of a Committee Appointed by the Secretary of
State for War to Enquire into the Administration of the Trans -
port and Supply Departments of the Army (1967, Vol. XV, p. 343),
p. 409. Hereinafter referred to as 1867 Report on Supply .
25
of such articles." Unfortunately, the Commander in Chief had
no authority regarding the distribution of supplies and could
do nothing about the situation. 42
.
Another major problem area of the army in the Crimea
lay in the field of ordnance. At the beginning of the war,
after forty years of relative peace, there were not enough
shells in the arsenal at Woolwich to arm the field army pro-
perly. Furthermore, many of the fuses in the store dated
from Waterloo. Parliamentary unwillingness to allocate funds
to the military forces in the intervening years had prevented
efficient progress in the production of armaments with the
result that the arsenal was totally unprepared to furnish
ample ordnance for a large-scale war. Shot, shell ammuni-
tion and gunpowder were lacking, and the Government was
eventually forced to look to private manufacturers for these
supplies and pay their exorbitant prices. In the end, England
even had to turn to foreign sources, as private British
manufacturers could not meet the demand.
42
Ibid., p. 430. Eventually, near the end of the war,
all stores in the Crimea were consolidated under the Ordnance
Department to the "great relief" of the troops there. (Testi-
mony of Major Arthur Leahy, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-
General in the Crimea, 1867 Report on Supply
, p. 531). Captain
Gordon directed the operation and was accountable only to the
General Officer Commanding in the Crimea. (Testimony of Gordon,
1860 Report on Military Organization
, p. 509 and testimony of
Gordon, 1867 Report on Supply
, p. 4 09)
.
A O
Andrew Wynter, "Woolwich Arsenal and its Manufactur-
ing Establishments," London Quarterly Review
,
January, 1858,
p. 122. England got 44,000 guns, 3000 cavalry swords and 12,000
barrels of powder from Liege and 20,000 barrels of powder from
the United States.
The Crimean War was unique in that military corres-
pondents living with the troops in the field, using the
steamship and the railroad, brought news of the war to
Britain much quicker than had been possible before. The
result was that the experiences of the troops before Sevasto-
pol and the workings of the military system became known and
consequently unacceptable to the English public. As Correlli
Barnett states: "For the first time in history the nation
knew what its soldiers were going through, and cared.
"
44
The Government in power, especially the Duke of New-
castle, necessarily bore the brunt of the public's wrath and
had to answer for the sins of previous governments which had
for forty years neglected the Army. This was unfortunate in
that the fault clearly lay with the system of administration
itself, much more so than with its administrators , and with
Parliament for having allowed the system to remain in a state
of such torpor for so long. Nonetheless, the end result of
the public outcry was the resignation of the Government in
January, 1855, and the hurried reorganization of Army adminis-
45
tration by its successor.
44Barnett, Britain and Her Army , p. 285.
45Trevelyan, History of England , III, p. 200 and
Fortescue, British Army , XIII, p. 162. The reorganization
came too late to be of any real impact in the Crimea. Sevas-
topol finally fell in Sept^ ber, 1855, and a peace was signed
on March 30, 1856.
CHAPTER III
REORGANIZATION 1855-1860
General
After the unfortunate scapegoats had departed, the new
Government under Lord Palmerston had to rectify quickly the
situation or risk suffering the same fate as its predecessor.
The incoming ministers therefore chose to reorganize the
system of Army administration immediately, notwithstanding
the fact that the midst of a Continental war was not neces-
sarily the best time to do so. Consequently, the reorganiza-
tion was hasty and was effected without a general overall plan
with defined principles. It was , as the noted historian of
the British Army, J.W. Fortescue, states, a headlong expedient
of "a Cabinet of terrified men, anxious to still popular
clamour and eager to show that they were doing something.""'"
They did more than just "something." By the time they were
through, the upper levels of Army administration were, to
outward appearances at least, completely overhauled.
Actually, the reorganization had begun under the
previous Government with the transfer in December, 1854, of
2
the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Department.
"'"Fortescue, British Army , XIII, p. 171.
The War Department was the name used to refer to the
office of the Secretary of State for War—the War Office was
27
28
However, not until the advent of the new Government were other
changes made. In an attempt to meet the most obvious need of
the Army, namely, a unifying force to pull together all the
various elements of Army administration in order to more
effectively supervise and direct the preparedness and opera-
tions of the Army, the new Government made the most important
innovation of all. In February, 1855, one man, Lord Panmure
(formerly Fox Maule) was appointed to be both Secretary at
War and Secretary of State for War thus effectively combining
the offices into one— the Secretary of State for War. Panmure
had felt that the condition of the army before Sevastopol
was "solely to be attributed to the want of proper control
by a single Minister of every department of the Army." There-
fore, he became the guiding force for the consolidation of
the two offices. He saw the combination of the offices as
being necessary for the "more speedy transaction of business,
and for giving the servant of the Crown who was responsible
for military administration, more defined and more extended
4powers than he had under the old system as Secretary at War."
A Royal Patent issued in May, 1855, made the consolidation of
the Secretary at War's office. Not until 1857 did the establish
ment headed by the Secretary of State for War become known as
the War Office. (Gordon, The War Office , pp. 51-52). Many
people, though, continued to refer to the War Office as the "War
Department .
"
3 Sir George Douglas and Sir George Dalhousie Ramsay, eds
The Panmure Papers , Vol. I (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908),
pp. 47-48.
testimony of Lord Panmure, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
,
p. 74.
the positions official.
The next major change involved the Board of Ordnance.
Lord Panmure engineered its abolition so that the Secretary of
State for War could present to the House of Commons in one
view and in one estimate the entirety of the country's military
expenses, instead of having three separate estimates as
before (the Secretary at War for the Army of the Line, the
Master General of Ordnance for the Artillery and the Scien-
tific Corps, and the Treasury for the Commissariat). Further-
more, Panmure had found that when he was Secretary of State
for War and the old Board of Ordnance still existed, he had
had to go through a "vast system" of correspondence just to
communicate orders. He felt it would be better if the Secre-
tary of State for War could issue these orders directly him-
self. Moreover, by controlling the departments which executed
these orders, he would attain greater speed and efficiency.
Consolidation with his office would also enable the Secretary
of State for War to ascertain immediately the condition of
? 6the warlike stores and all the other types of stores.
Consequently, an Order in Council of June, 1855,
abolished the Board and, in its place, several officers were
c
"Extract from Third Part Patent Roll of the Eighteenth
year of the Reign of Queen Victoria, 22 May 1855," 1860 Report
on Military Organization
,
Appendix 2, p. 610.
testimony of Lord Panmure, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
,
pp. 81-82 and 89
.
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appointed heads of departments under the Secretary of State '
for War (Appendix B)
.
The military command of the Artillery
was transferred to the Commander in Chief, but the Inspector
General of Fortifications, now directly responsible to the
Secretary of State for War, retained the command of the
Engineers. The Inspector General of Fortifications also
functioned as an adviser to the Secretary of State for War on
questions of maintenance and improvement of fortifications and
on construction of barracks and other buildings. His duties
as an adviser thus essentially dealt with the so-called
civil side of Engineer functions while his other duties as
commander of the Royal Engineers dealt with military matters.
The Secretary of State for War also retained the position of
Director General of Artillery to advise on artillery and
9* •
ammunition
.
7Order in Council, dated June 6, 1855, 1860 Report on
Military Organization
,
Appendix 1, pp. 595-98. The business
connected with both the Medical Department and the Home Depart-
ment (regarding the Militia) had been transferred to the War
Department soon after Panmure took office.
gTestimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, the Permanent Under
Secretary of State, 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 123.
Q
The Secretary of State for War also appointed a Naval
Director of Artillery to advise on naval ordnance because the
Manufacturing Departments at Woolwich, formerly under the Board
of Ordnance and now under the Secretary of State for War, pro-
^
duced naval armaments as well as those of the Army. The position
did not endure long, however. As the job actually entailed
little work, in an economy move, the Director, Navy Captain J.C.
Caff in, was also appointed the Director General of Stores and
Clothing in 1857. This was a new position resulting from the
amalgamation of the Stores and Clothing departments. Caff in
retained the duties of his former position in his new one even
though the formal position of Naval Director of Artillery was
31
The Director General of Stores assumed the bulk of '
the duties of the former Principal Storekeeper. These duties
mainly dealt with the superintendence of actions regarding the
receipt, custody, control and issue of military stores. The
Director General of Contracts supplied all military and other
stores by means of public competition and contracts and super-
intended the execution of all agreements made by him up to the
time of their final completion. The Director General of Army
Clothing provided clothing to the Army. The Board of General
Officers was therefore eliminated. Lastly, the Accountant
General now controlled, audited and brought to account the
entire receipts and expenditure of Army administration. 10
Although the clerical staffs of the various depart-
ments were consolidated in the Secretary of State for War's
Office in January, 1856, the new organization was not official
fixed until February, 1857, by an Order in Council. The posi-
tions of Clerk of Ordnance, Deputy Secretary at War, Naval
Director of Artillery and Director General of Clothing were
eliminated and* an Assistant Under Secretary of State and a
Secretary for Military Correspondence were added. Also, the
Director General of Stores' duties were expanded to include
eliminated. (Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization
,
p. 121)
.
10Order in Council, dated June 6, 1855, 1860 Report
on Military Organization, Appendix 1, pp. 595-98.
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the superintendence of clothing. 11
The War Office was further consolidated by the establish
ment of its various departments in 1858 under one roof in Pall
Mall, except for the Medical Department and the Inspector
General of Fortifications' Office which were located at White-
hall. The most obvious and important exception though was the
Commander in Chief's office which remained at the Horse
Guards
.
At this time it is possible to make a general compari-
son of cost and personnel between the old and the new organiza
tions
.
In terms of economy, the reorganization did not save
the British nation any money. The chart below details the
cost of the military control establishment from two years
before the consolidation to four years after it using
1
3
1855 as the basic year of the union.
Order in Council, dated February 2, 18 57. Panmure
retained the Clerk of Ordnance to provide continuity of adminis-
tration between the old and new organizations. ( 1860 Report
on Military Organization
, p. 86) The organization and duties
of each of the departments thus fixed are indicated in Appen-
dix C.
Gordon, The War Office, p. 58, and testimony of Sir
Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 129.
The term "Horse Guards" referred to the Commander in Chief's
office. The Horse Guards was the name given to a building near
Whitehall in London located on the grounds where Charles II had
housed his mounted troops. Before the reorganization, the office
of the Secretary of War, as well as that of the Commander in Chief,
was located there. (Gordon, The War Office , p. 31)
.
13Returns of the Annual Establishment Charges of the
33
War War Ord. Commis- Miscel-
Dept. Office Dept. sariat laneous Total
h h h h h h
1853- 54 32,947 65,484 4996 13,537 116,964
1854- 55 9. 983 36,760 62,268 4678 14,569 127, 658
1855- 56 22,932 49,053 70,873 5082 16.559 164 ,499
1856- 57 179,878 i>— 179.878
1857- 58 166,968 166,968
1858- 59 169,029 169,029
As indicated, there is a difference of more than h
50,000 in cost between 1853-54, when there was peace and the
Army was administered under the old system, and 1858-59 when
there was again peace but the Army was under new organization.
The increase in cost resulted from several factors. First and
foremost, the increased business caused by the Crimean War
necessitated the hiring of additional temporary personnel to
assist permanent clerks with the workload. In 1855, there-
fore, before the consolidation of clerical staffs under the
Secretary of State for War, there were 506 clerks (321 perma-
nent, 185 temporary) employed in the various departments. As
a result of the hiring of temporary clerks, by 1855-56 the cost
of the establishment had risen nearly h 50,000 and it remained
Departments now Consolidated in that of War, for Four Years
previous to their Consolidation: And, of the Annual Establish-
ment Charges of the Department of War since such Consolidation
up to the present~Time (1857-58, Vol. XXXVII, p. 589), p. 589
and "An Account of the Annual Charge of the United Establish-
ment," 1860 Report on Military Organization , Appendix 2, p.
626. These figures do not include the Commander in Chief's office.
34
relatively constant for the next three years, even though
1858-59 was a year of virtual peace. Although the increased
business cawed by the Indian Mutiny in 1857-58 required the
retention of the temporary clerks, the real reason that costs
remained high was the result of the organization itself. The
formation of the consolidated War Office under the Secretary
of State for War greatly increased the workload of that office.
The formation of the Clothing Department alone justified the
maintenance of a large clerical staff. However, when the
increased business caused by the formation of this one depart-
ment was combined with the increases occasioned by the transfer
of business from other offices to the War Office, along with
the other inherent business of the office, the increase in
14
volume was enormous and a larger staff became a necessity.
As a result, clerical personnel were not released after hostili-
ties in India were concluded and, in 1859, there were 513
15
clerks employed in the War Office.
The number and total salaries of principal officers
(i.e., supervisory personnel, department heads and principal
secretaries) also remained remarkably stable throughout the
period. The chart below depicts the changes in the upper ranks
. In 1853 a total of 162,088 letters were received and
201,000 were written by the several departments administering the
Army. In 1859, 332,631 letters were received by the War Office
and 518,906 were written. ( 1860 Report on Military Organization ,
pp. 124-25 [testimony of Hawes] and Appendix 10, p. 707 ["State-
ment of the Number of Letters Received and Written"]).
15 1860 Report on Military Organization, Appendix 2, p.
626. Of the 513 clerks employed in 1859-60, 328 were permanent
and 18 5 were temporary. ( 1860 Report on Military Organization,
Appendix 2, p. 625).
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•s
'
of Army administration (except for the Commander in Chief
office) from 1854 to 1859 in terms of total salary differences
and numbers of positions eliminated and added. 16
Positions Positions
added eliminated Add/elim positions
number of total total total net re- net diffpositions salaries # salary # salary suit in salary
1854 25 £26, 323 —
1856 30 £33,200 13 £17,327 8 £12,080 +5 +£5247 17
1859 29 £32,585 8 £ 8,485 9 £10,500 -1 -£2015 18
In terms of numbers then, principal officers did not
undergo a drastic change during the reorganization. Even in
terms of salary, there was onJLy a £6000 difference between
1854 and 1859, £2000 of which can be attributed to salary
increases in retained positions. The largest single addition
to the salary figures was the Secretary of State for War at
£5000 annually, while the largest single elimination was the
1
9
Master General or Ordnance at £3000 per year.
The real turbulence in the ranks of the principal
officers came in the designation of their positions. For
1
6
1860 Report on Military Organization
,
Appendix 2,
pp. 627-28.
17The discrepancy between the sum of this figure and
the figure listed as "total salaries" for 1854 with that listed
for "total salaries" for 1856 is the result of salary increases
totalling £1630 in retained positions.
1
8
The discrepancy between the sum of this figure and
the figure listed as "total salaries" for 1856 with that listed
for "total salaries" for 1859 is the result of salary increases
totalling £1400 in retained positions.
p. 628.
19 1860 Report on Military Organization, Appendix 2,
example, only twelve of the twenty five positions extant in '
1854 still existed in 1859. 20 Seventeen of the twenty five
positions survived in 1856, but thirteen new ones were added,
thereby altering the structure of the War Department sub-
stantially. However, even though a number of designations
were new, many of the principal office-holders were not new-
comers to the Army's administrative apparatus. For example,
the Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, had been the
Secretary at War from 184 6 to 1852. The Accountant General,
Mr. Kirby, had been the Chief Examiner in the Secretary at
War's Office before the reorganization and, in his new posi-
tion, he was responsible for vitually the same duties as
before, albeit with several additions. The Assistant
Director of Clothing, Mr. Ramsay, had been the Private Secre-
tary to Sidney Herbert, the Secretary at War from 1852 to
1854, and had assisted in the introduction of the new method
of clothing the Army. Furthermore, Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of
Ordnance; Sir Benjamin Hawes , the Deputy Secretary at War;
General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, the Inspector General of Forti
20Two private secretaries, three members of the Inspec-
tor General of Fortification's office, the Director of Surveys,
the Director General of the Army Medical Department, two members
of the Military Superintendent of Pensioners' office, the
Chaplain General and two members of the Solicitor's office.
( 1860 Report on Military Organization , Appendix 2, p. 628).
21Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization
,
p. 121 and Great Britain, Parliament,
Second Report of a Committee Appointed to enquire into the
Organization of the War Office . Military and Naval Parliamentary
Papers, Vol.
.4 (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971
[originally published 1864]), p. 331. Hereinafter referred to a
1864 War Office.
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fications; Sir Alexander Tullock, the Superintendent of Pen-'
sioners; Andrew Smith, the Director General of the Medical
Department; and Lord Hardinge, the Commander in Chief; all
held their positions before the reorganization and retained
them after it in virtually the same form. 22
In conclusion, the reorganization resulted in in-
creased expense, in virtually no change in the total number
of personnel employed in Army administration and in little
immediate infusion of new personalities into the Army hier-
archy. Therefore, analysis of the reorganization must proceed
beyond mere numbers and personalities in order to determine and
assess real changes.
Correspondence and the Conduct of Business
within the War Office
After the reorganization, the War Office received and
23generated an immense amount of correspondence. The conduct
2 2 *1860 Report on Military Organization
, pp. 73, 86,
115, 121, 124, 179 and 348; 1856 Medical Department , p. 374;
and Woodham-Smith , The Reason Why
,
p. 130. Mr. Howell, the
Director of Contracts, and John R. Godley, The Director General
of Stores, were new to Army administration. ( 1860 Report on
Military Organization
, pp. 120 and 179). The Director of
Clothing, Sir T. Troubridge, had been appointed by Panmure after
losing both legs at the Battle of Inkerman while serving with
the 7th Fusiliers. (Douglas and Ramsay, eds . , Panmure Papers ,
I, p. 227). Available information on the remaining few office-
holders immediately before and after the reorganization is vague
and no conclusions can be made as to their status.
23 Incoming correspondence averaged between 900 and 1000
letters a day in 1859 while outgoing correspondence averaged
nearly 1500 letters a day. See footnote 14 above.
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of its business necessarily revolved around this correspondence
and was governed by a complicated system of receipt, regis-
tration, dissemination and response.
All correspondence for the War Office arrived in the
Registry room in Pall Mall where it was opened, registered
and distributed to the proper office, or offices, for action. 24
Upon receipt in the appropriate office, or offices, a letter
was first examined by a junior clerk (or several junior clerks)
and passed on to the department head. The department head
would then forward it, if necessary, to one of the Under
Secretaries of State or to the Secretary for Military Corres-
pondence according to a scheme approved by Lord Panmure in
25August, 1857. By this arrangement the Assistant Under
Secretary of State handled financial subjects, stores, clothing
and contracts, the Permanent Under Secretary of State took
political and miscellaneous subjects and office arrangements,
and the Secretary for Military Correspondence the military
and professional sub j ects . Thus
,
according to this scheme
,
the proper reporting channels for major department heads
were as follows
:
Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization
, pp. 127-28. The system of registration
used was the same as that used in the old Secretary at War's
office albeit modified and improved.
25Memorandum Number 121, War Office, 8 August 1857, 136
Report on Military Organization, Appendix 1, p. 60 0. Panmure
established the position of Secretary for Military Correspon-
dence to correspond principally with the Military Secretary
at the Horse Guards upon all matters relating to discipline,
the distribution and movement of troops and other military
matters
.
Director of Stores and Clothing Assistant Under Sec-
retary of State
Director of Contracts Assistant Under Sec-
retary of State
Inspector General
of Fortifications Permanent Under Sec-
retary of State
Chaplain General and Inspec-
tor General of Schools Permanent Under Sec-
retary of State
Commissary General Permanent Under Sec-
retary of State
Solicitor Permanent Under Sec-
retary of State
Director General of Artillery Secretary for Mili-
tary Correspondence
Military Superintendent
of Pensioners Secretary for Mili-
tary Correspondence
The eventual limit of any one item's progression from
bottom to top was determined by its import. Thus, letters
of importance eventually went to the Secretary for War by
the appropriate person for decision. Papers were transferred
from one person to the next by the transmission of the
papers (letters) themselves via an elaborate system of
minuting, which was nothing more than the independent writing
of opinions without discussion on the issues involved. Each
person who handled the correspondence (except for registration
and distribution) placed his comments either on the letter
itself or on an additional sheet (or sheets) and then for-
warded the whole to the next indicated person in the chain
40
as necessary. 26 Documents thereby often ended up much more '
voluminous than when they arrived at the War Office.
When a decision relating to a letter was made, a
junior clerk in an appropriate office prepared the answer and
submitted it to the proper person for signature according to
a signature scheme approved by Lord Panmure. 27
As explained by Sir Benjamin Hawes , this elaborate
system served as a screening process which offered the Secre-
tary for War the benefit of systematic advice from his subor-
dinates. "Nothing secures the Secretary of State so much
against any possible error in an important case," he stated,
"as its having come under the deliberate review of the seniors
or heads of branches , men most experienced in the office, and
2 8the Under Secretaries." Hawes felt that the system worked
well and the business of the War Office was "tolerably success-
fully conducted" by a "good classification of business, a
good subdivision of labour, and a continual and cordial co-
29
operation . . . [within the War Office]." He pointed
2 6Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
, pp. 110, 127-28 and 130-31. Documents of great im-
portance or those requiring immediate attention were forwarded
directly to an Under Secretary or to the Secretary for War if nec-
cessary by the Registrar. ( 1860 Report on Military Organization ,
p. 133).
The terms "Secretary of State for War" and "Secretary for
War" are interchangeable and refer to the same person.
27Memorandum Number 202, War Office, 15 January 1858, 1860
Report on Military Organization , Appendix 1 , pp . 6 01-0 3 . For
example, letters conveying directly the Queen's pleasure to an
officer of state or the Commander in Chief were to be signed by the
Secretary for War. Letters to Members of Parliament were to be
signed by the Parliamentary Under Secretary and letters addressed t
persons holding the equivalent rank of Under Secretary or to key
General Officers were to be signed by the Permanent Under Secretary
28 1860 Roport on Military Organization, p. 131. Ibid.,p.l36.
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out that the average time necessary to process a letter (open,
register, distribute, attach former correspondence relating
to the same subject, examination by appropriate branch or
branches, minute, write answer, signature, copy and register)
was four days. 30
Hawes had been employed as the Deputy Secretary at
War before the reorganization, and he compared the average
time of answering correspondence in the reorganized War
Office favorably with that of his former office. In fact, in
1859, he told the Parliamentary Committee on military organi-
zation that, "I am inclined to think that they [letters] are
answered more promptly, if you take the average of a large
number." He attributed this promptness to the fact that in
the old War Office, a paper was not considered in arrears
until it had been in the office for fourteen days; thus,
people were not under pressure to react promptly. Furthermore,
the Crimean War had caused an influx of inexperienced temporary
clerks which resulted in a slowdown of work until the clerks
31
gained experience and the new organization stabilized itself."
Thus, in terms of efficiency in handling correspon-
dence, the reorganized War Office apparently more than held
its own in comparison to its predecessor—an admirable
achievement when one takes into account the increased size
and complexity of the reorganized office and the enormous
increase in the amount of correspondence between 1853 (363,008
30 Ibid., p. 132.
31 Ibid., pp. 133-34.
letters written or received by the departments administering'
the Army) and 1859 (851,537 letters written or received by the
War Office)
.
32
.
Not everyone was as enthusiastic about the system as
Hawes, however. That it was not universally accepted is evi-
denced by dissension over it within senior ranks of the War
Office itself. The major complaint, and a well founded one,
was that the system was simply too complex. John William
Smith, the Commissary General, voiced this view in 1859.
Although the average time of answering correspondence
• compared
favorably with the past, Smith felt that the time occupied
in the transaction of business in the War Office was still
"much slower than it ought to be ... I consider [the system]
3 3to be extremely defective.
"
As an example of how the system often delayed busi-
ness by elaborate handling of minute matters, Smith cited the
case of a request by his department to increase the salary
of a messenger in Malta by a penny a day. As he did not him-
self have the authority to sanction such a raise, Smith sent
a recommendation for approval of it to the office of the
Permanent Under Secretary. The recommendation then went from
that office to a clerk in the Accountant General's Office, as
it was a financial matter, and from there back to the Permanent
32Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization
, pp. 124-25 and Appendix 10, p. 707.
33 Ibid.
,
p. 292
.
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Under Secretary's office. That office returned it to Smith
for comment. He in turn sent it on again to the Permanent
Under Secretary's office where it was finally approved by
Sir Benjamin Hawes
.
The entire transaction took nine days
and required eight separate written minutes. 34 Smith there-
fore felt that there was "so much superfluous writing that it
becomes excessively troublesome. It is not only a positive
discouragement, but it gives a sort of negative feeling to
3 5the transaction of business."
Major General Jonathan Peel, the Secretary of State
for War from February, 1858, to June, 1859, agreed with Smith
that many papers were needlessly delayed by unnecessary
minuting, especially those relating to expense. He thus
altered the system so that letters went to department heads
first, not to junior clerks, and worked down from the top
within the departments. Junior clerks still minuted letters
but not nearly so much as before, and the alteration of the
system resulted in a slight improvement in efficiency. On
the other hand, Peel believed that even though registration
delayed the distribution of letters, it was important.
Registration created a record which prevented the filing away
of unwelcome correspondence and which formed a basis for the
investigation of complaints concerning a particular letter or
department. 3 ^
34 Ibid., p. 293
35 Ibid., p. 296.
36 Ibid.
, p. 340.
With the Commander in Chief located at the Horse
Guards, the Inspector General of Fortifications and the Medical
Department at Whitehall, and the rest of the War Office at
Pall Mall, the War Office obviously lacked complete physical
unity. This lack was accentuated by the method the War Office
adopted for correspondence with both the Commander in Chief's
office and the Medical Department. The standard system of
minuting, used in correspondence with other subordinate
departments, was not applicable to correspondence with these
two departments. The War Office communicated with each by
letter and correspondence from both was received, registered
and distributed just like incoming correspondence from outside
agencies, such as the Colonial Office and the Indian Depart-
ment
.
It appears as if there was no definite rationale for
this arrangement regarding the Medical Department other than
3 8
"it has always been so." Actually, since the time of the
reorganization, the War Office had largely disregarded the
Medical Department. In fact, at the time of the reorganization,
37Testimony of John Robert Godley, Assistant Under
Secretary of State for War, 1860 Report on Military Organiza -
tion, p. 191. Curiously, correspondence with the Inspector
General of Fortifications followed the normal method. Hawes
gave no explanation for this situation other than it was con-
templated that the office would one day be brought to Pall Mall.
( 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 129-30). I would
assume therefore, that no one believed that either the Commander
in Chief or the Medical Department would be moving to Pall Mall
in the immediate future.
38Testimony of Godley, 1860 Report on Military Organi -
zation, p. 192.
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the Medical Department had received no official document
regarding the changes in the War Department. It became aware
of them only through "the working of the department" and
through the fact that all incoming mail was addressed to it
either by the Secretary for War or the Commander in Chief
instead of by the several administrative authorities as
before. 39
Thus, the Medical Department was not totally sub-
ordinated to the War Office in the conduct of its business
and, unlike any other department, it communicated, under its
Director's name, directly with the Commander in Chief. Sub-
jects for such correspondence were limited to matters relating
to discipline (for which the Commander in Chief was responsible)
,
medical officer requirements for regiments, promotions and
recruiting. The department dealt with the Secretary for War
in all other matters. 40 The War Office had no way of knowing
the substance of the correspondence between the two theoreti-
cally subordinate offices but this uncertainty does not seem
to have been of great concern. General Peel even went so far
as to state that the Medical Department's duties were "more
with the Horse Guards" than with the War Office, and that the
3 9Testimony of Andrew Smith, the Director General of
the Medical Department, 1856 Medical Department , p. 374.
40
Ibid. See also the testimony of His Royal Highness
Prince George Duke of Cambridge, Queen Victoria's cousin, who
was appointed Commander in Chief in 1856, 18 60 Report on
Military Organization, p. 380.
46
resulting dual correspondence was "a necessary consequence of
|
the double position.
"
41
I
Peel placed great confidence in his subordinates' sense
Iof responsibility to keep him informed of any important develop-
ments regarding the Medical Department. "if there was any- 1
thing which it was necessary for the War Department to know,"
he stated, "I take for granted that it would be forwarded to |
that department, either by the Military Secretary or by the
Medical Director himself." 42 !
By far the most autonomous office under the reorganiza
tion was that of the Commander in Chief. The relationship
between the Secretary for War and the Commander in Chief had
been stipulated in the Royal Patent of May 18, 1855, which
officially consolidated the Secretary at War's position with
that of the Secretary of State for War. The Patent stated
the new Secretary for War's duties in these terms:
the administration and government of our Army . . .
and our ordnance, ammunition, arms, armouries,
and other stores and provisions, and habliments of
war within our United Kingdom, shall be and the same
are hereby wholly committed to and vested in . . .
Baron Panmure . . . Excepting always so far as relates
to and concerns the military command and discipline of
our Army . . . appointments to and promotions in the
same . . . [which are] vested in, or regulated by our
Commander in Chief of our Forces, or our General
41 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 339. See also
the testimony of Godley, 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 193
AO ...
Testimony of Peel, 1860 Report on Military Organiza-
tion, p. 339.
commanding our Forces in Chief for the time
being. 4 3
Thus, the Secretary of State for War and the Commander
in Chief were to share in the administration of the Army and
the dualism in Army control was to continue officially. The
Commander in Chief ruled supreme in military command and
discipline and controlled appointments to and promotions in
the Army, while the Secretary for War was supreme in all else.
However, regardless of the need for close and imme-
diate contact between the office of the Commander in Chief
and the War Office, the latter regarded the Horse Guards as
an entirely separate entity in the conduct of business and
correspondence. Such correspondence was thus carried out on
a formal basis. The formality, of course, increased the
work of both offices enormously
.
44 v
Except in urgent matters, there was no direct letter
communication between the Commander in Chief and the Secretary
for War. The Under Secretaries had previously objected to
the establishment of such a system and General Peel had
agreed with them. He felt it absolutely necessary that the
Under Secretaries be aware of what was passing between the
Horse Guards and the War Office prior to the dispatch of
4 3 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 17 and
Royal Patent of May 22, 1855, Appendix 2, p. 610.
44 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 195 (Godley)
,
339 (Peel) and 380 (Duke of Cambridge). Between 20,000 and
30,000 letters a year passed between them with an average return
time per letter of between six and ten days.
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correspondence to the Horse Guards and upon receipt of corres-
pondence therefrom. This factor, along with a copying system
used in the War Office to record the substance of all corres-
pondence, were the major reasons why correspondence with the
Horse Guards took so long. 45
Urgent documents, however, went from either the
Secretary for War or the Secretary for Military Correspondence
directly to the Commander in Chief, who answered them immedi-
ately. The opposite was also true in that the Commander in
Chief or his Military Secretary often sent urgent papers
directly to the Secretary for War. Other important, less
pressing materials were often sent without formal correspon-
dence and minuting for the immediate opinion of the Commander
4 6m Chief and were returned within an hour to the War Office.
The system was thus not totally inflexible.
In conclusion, even though the system of correspondence
and the conduct of business was not uniformly applicable to
all subordinate elements, and even though it fostered an
abundance of often needless and repetitive paperwork, it had
come a long way toward solving two of the major deficiencies
4 S
Testimony of General Peel, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
, p. 339.
46Testimony of Major General Sir Edward Lugard, the
Secretary for Military Correspondence, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
,
p. 228. See also General Peel's testimony,
1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 339.
49
of Army administration in the past—namely, lack of unity and
communication. As the result of the reorganization, unity
of administration was, with the above noted exceptions, a
reality and there was no lack of communication among adminis-
trative authorities. If anything, there was now an over-
abundance of communication between them. Thus, Army adminis-
tration had nearly come full circle— from not enough communi-
cation to almost too much communication.
Civil-Military Relations
Theoretically, the relationship between the Secretary
for War and the Commander in Chief was governed by the pro-
visions of the Royal Patent of May 18, 1855. In reality, as
the result of historical precedent, the actual relations
between these two officials transcended the boundaries of the
Patent in a manner which made it clear that the real authority
in all matters dealing with the Army was in the hands of the
Secretary for War. The Commander in Chief's responsibilities
according to the Patent remained his officially, but he could
4
do very little without the sanction of the Secretary for War.
To reiterate, the reorganization of 1855 merely con-
centrated civil control over the Army into the hands of one
person, the Secretary for War.
48 Like the Secretary at War,
47 See the testimony of Lord Panmure, 1860 Report on
Military Organization, p . 112.
48Testimony of Sidney Herbert, the Secretary at War in
1845-46 and 1852-54 and the Secretary for War in 1859-60, I860
Report on Military Organization, pp. 519-20. See also I860
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the Secretary for War took an active part in the theoretically
privileged domain of the Commander in Chief relating to
appointments and promotions. Although the Commander in Chief
actually selected the persons, the Secretary for War exercised
the general power of sanction, in case of technical irregu-
larities, as each action involved expense. Furthermore, like
the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies and the Home
Secretary before him, the Secretary for War acted as a sanc-
tioning authority in all cases of appointment to command in
4 9
military units.
Finally, as the Secretary at War had done, the Secre-
tary for War interfered in the discipline of the Army in cases
in which there was Parliamentary interest and in all cases in
which the Military came into contact with the civil population.
In the past, the Secretary at War had repeatedly discussed
with the Commander in Chief these questions and other matters
dealing with discipline. The Commander in Chief, for his part,
had traditionally sought the opinion of the Cabinet and/or the
Report on Military Organization
, pp. 349 (Duke of Cambridge)
,
311-12 (Peel), 114 (Panmure) , and 157 (Hawes)
.
49Testimony of Sidney Herbert, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
, pp. 518-19.
50Lord Grey, the Secretary at War from 1835 to 1839,
had had to debate constantly the question of corporal punish-
ment and defend the Horse Guards on this issue in the House
of Commons and on the issue of the wearing of sidearms by
soldiers who came into contact with the civil population.
Sidney Herbert stated he had had similar experiences. ( I860
Report on Military Organization, pp. 457 and 516)
.
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War Office on controversial questions such as corporal punish-
ment, the wearing of side arms and the rendering of salutes
during religious processions. In all such matters, the
Commander in Chief and the Secretary at War had been in con-
51stant contact with each other. Thus, like the Secretary
at War, the Secretary for War necessarily remained in close
touch with the Commander in Chief regarding discipline and
everything else dealing with the administration of the Army.
While official communication between the War Office
and the Horse Guards was an exercise in bureaucracy to the
nth degree, this paper shuffling did not characterize the
direct personal contact between the Secretary for War and the
Commander in Chief, which, from all available evidence, seems
to have been abundant, polite and agreeable to both parties.
Lord Panmure felt that communication between himself and the
Commander in Chief (Lord Hardinge and later the Duke of
Cambridge) was as easy, frequent and confidential as that
between himself as Secretary at War and the Commander in Chief
t 52before the reorganization. In August, 1859, General Peel
noted that "there was hardly a day that I did not see . . .
the Commander in Chief" and that no difference of opinion
between himself and the Commander in Chief ever emerged on a
53
final decision made by him (Peel) . Sidney Herbert also
511860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 311-12
(Peel) , 457 (Grey) and 349 (Duke of Cambridge)
.
52 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 76.
53 Ibid., pp. 341-42.
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stated that he saw the Commander in Chief almost daily, and
that his relations with the Commander in Chief were perfectly
54satisfactory. From the other perspective, the Duke of
Cambridge agreed that his relations with the Secretary for
War were satisfactory. He stated that he called on the
Secretary for War nearly every day and that no question had
arisen between them over his exercise of the military command
and discipline of the Army. He related that he alerted the
Secretary for War to every movement of troops at home and
abroad and that appointments and promotions were "invariably"
referred to him. Furthermore^ he stated in August, 1859, that
he had never had any difficulty with any of the three Secre-
5 5taries under which he had served (Panmure, Peel and Herbert)
.
Thus, on the surface at least/ relations seemed to
have been quite amicable. The policy of each Secretary
appears to have been one of basic non-intervention in the day-
to-day affairs of the Commander in Chief, which may explain
the apparent friendliness between them. In reality, the
Secretary for War's role was basically that of a sanctioning
and consulting authority in regard to the reserved duties of
*
the Commander in Chief. Nevertheless, as Lord Panmure explained
the Secretary for War had "not only the right, but . . . [the]
bounden duty to interfere" in cases of extreme conduct on the
part of the Commander in Chief.
54 Ibid.
, pp. 566 and 568-69.
55 Ibid., pp. 349 and 364-65.
56
Ibid.
, p. 77.
Thus, there was some vagueness as to the relation-
ship of the Secretary for War and the Commander in Chief. On
the one hand, the Royal Patent defined the exceptions to the
Secretary's powers reserved for the Commander in Chief. On
the other hand, these exceptions were not really effective in
view of the financial and political situation. The Secretary
for War recognized these exceptions in theory but reserved
the right to interfere in any aspects of Army administration
when he felt it necessary. In practice, the Secretary for War
rarely exercised this option in regard to discipline, except
in cases of Parliamentary concern, and even then his actions
usually took the form of consultation with, rather than orders
to the Commander in Chief. Although civil authority was thus
supreme in all aspects of Army administration , it was only
applied peripherally to internal Army matters and the dual
authority over the Army continued.
Armaments and Artillery Administration
Aside * from the transfer of command from the Master
General of Ordnance to the Commander in Chief in 1855 , no
major changes occurred in the organization of the Artillery,
which was termed satisfactory and efficient in May, 1860, by
57
Sidney Herbert, the Secretary for War. However, several
changes and innovations took place in the upper level adminis-
57 Ibid.
,
p. 539.
54
tration regarding armaments.
Before the reorganization, the Director General of
Artillery, subordinate to the Master General of Ordnance, was
responsible for the armament of all fortresses. After the
reorganization, Panmure retained the Director General as an
adviser and as the person in charge of the armaments and
material of fortresses. However, in May, 1859, when the post
lay vacant, General Peel, the Secretary for War, abolished it
and transferred its duties to the Commander in Chief. He
felt that all aspects of artillery administration should be in
the hands of the Commander in Chief who already had charge
of the personnel and discipline of the Corps of Artillery, but
not of the armaments and material in its keeping in the for-
58tresses
.
The duties of the former Director General of Artillery
were exercised under the Commander in Chief by the Deputy
Adjutant General of Artillery and the Deputy Adjutant General
of Engineers together with the Defense Committee. The Defense
Committee consisted of military officers named by the Com-
mander in Chief, with the Secretary for War's sanction, to
assist him (the Commander in Chief) in performing the duties
of the Director General of Artillery. The Defense Committee's
major function was to offer professional advice through the
Commander in Chief to the Secretary for War to assist the
58Testimony of General Peel, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
,
p. 327. See also the Testimony of Sir Benjamin
Hawes, 1860 Report on Military Organization, pp. 149-50.
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latter in making judgments regarding fortresses (including '
design) and their armaments. The Committee consisted of
the Quartermaster-General, a naval officer, two artillery
officers, two engineers, a secretary and the Commander in
59Chief.
Before this change, fortress and armament plans had
been submitted to the Commander in Chief, but since he was
not a professional engineer, his opinion was not as valuable
then as later when artillery and engineer officers assisted
him. Consequently, the Duke of Cambridge felt that there was
"a great deal more sifting [of plans and armaments] now than
there ever was before, in consequence of these new arrange-
ments." Also, by presiding over the Defense Committee, the
Duke acknowledged that the Commander in Chief had a more
extensive view of all military operations at home and abroad
than had his predecessors.^
Notwithstanding these alterations , it should be
pointed out that when the duties and responsibilities of the
Director General of Artillery were transferred to the Com-
mander in Chief, the only real change was that a different
person now held responsibility for recommendations relating
to armaments and materiel of fortresses. The same people
Testimony of the Duke of Cambridge, 1860 Report on
Military Organization
,
p. 370. See also the testimony of
Sir Benjamin Hawes , 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 149-50
60Testimony of the Duke of Cambridge, 1860 Report on
Military Organization , p. 371. See also the testimony of Sidney
Herbert, 1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 539.
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who performed artillery duties before the transfer did so
afterward. Moreover, all the armaments remained in the charge
of the same artillery officers at their locations. These
officers now reported through the Adjutant General to the
Commander in Chief instead of directly to the Director General
of Artillery as before. 61
In addition to the Defense Committee, the Secretary
for War had two other sources of advice on armaments— the
Inspector General of Fortifications and the Ordnance Select
Committee. The Ordnance Select Committee, created in 1859,
received, reported on and experimented with all inventions
or improvements submitted to the Secretary for War relating
to arms of all natures and to gunpowder. The Committee was
entirely independent of the manufacturing departments and of
6 2all parties interested in inventions themselves. Thus, the
Secretary for War had available to him two sources of advice
^Testimony of General Peel, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
, pp. 325 and 333.
6 2 ?Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization
, p. 141. The Ordnance Select Committee
was made up of military men from the Royal Artillery, the Royal
Engineers and the line exclusively employed in the conduct of
the Committee's duties. (Testimony of General Burgoyne, the
Inspector General of Fortifications, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
, p. 248). The Ordnance Select Committee replaced
another committee with a similar function also called the
Ordnance Select Committee. The former Ordnance Select Committee
consisted of seventeen persons, both military and civilian. It
was found inadequate because of its large size and because its
members were all employed in positions (e.g., Superintendent
of the Royal Laboratory) which made them intimately concerned
with inventions and with the manufacturing departments.
(Testimony of Hawes, 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp.
140-41)
.
within the War Office itself, independent of the Horse Guards,
to assist him in making decisions regarding armaments. This
particular point is significant in that again we have an
instance of organizational perpetuation of the dualism in
Army administration. Although the War Office advisers were
military men, they were independent of the Commander in Chief
and acted as a counterbalance to him. Instead of one com-
mittee which consisted of the best professionals available and
which could have dissected and presented all options to the
Secretary for War, he had three separate channels of advice,
two of them directly subordinate to him on the civil side
of Army administration. Consequently, the Horse Guards 1
advice counterweighted that given to the Secretary for War
by his own direct subordinates. Though not so crucial a
factor in the dualism as others , it does point up the
fact that even in the sphere of professional military
advice, the Secretary for War found it useful to have his own
independent advisers
.
Engineers
Before the reorganization of 1855, the Master General
of Ordnance directed the training, discipline and works of the
Royal Engineers. Immediately after the reorganization, the
Inspector General of Fortifications commanded the Engineers
until May, 1859, when command went to the Commander in Chief.
Previously, even though the Engineers were under the
58
discipline of the Inspector General of Fortifications, they '
received all their directions regarding discipline from the
Horse Guards. They also acted according to Horse Guards'
regulations in every respect regarding military organization
and arrangements, even though the Engineers were raised for
civil duties (works, surveys, etc.) and were not trained
specifically as soldiers. Furthermore, in a campaign, the
Engineers had come under the General Officer Commanding, not
the War Office. Thus, the Engineers had not been completely
divorced from the Horse Guards in the past and their new
relationship did not amount to a great change, at least in
terms of discipline .
^
Even though the Inspector General lost the command
of the Engineers, he did remain the Secretary at War's adviser
on fortifications. The main reason that the entire office of
the Inspector General of Fortifications was not transferred
to the Horse Guards was because of Treasury objections to
this change. The Treasury desired the Secretary for War to
retain in his 'office the means both of originating proposals
for the construction of works and for checking such proposals
which might reach him from the Commander in Chief. As the
Secretary for War was responsible for presenting such pro-
posals to Parliament, the Treasury felt that he should pos-
63Testimony of General Burgoyne, 1860 Report on
Military Organization, pp. 241, 244 and 24 6.
sess the means of determining for himself the fitness of theifi
as objects for the expenditure of public money. General Peel
assented to this and the Inspector General of Fortifications
64
remained m the War Office.
One modification brought about by the transfer of
command was in the method of communication between the Inspec-
tor General of Fortifications and the Commander in Chief.
When the Inspector General also commanded the Engineers, he
communicated directly with the Commander in Chief. However,
after the transfer, he was completely subordinated to the
Secretary for War, through whom he now communicated with the
6 5Commander in Chief. Thus the Commander in Chief lost the
benefit of the Inspector General 1 s wide-ranging experience
and expertise
.
The most controversial change brought by the trans-
fer of command involved the method of appointment and assign-
ment of Corps of Engineers officers. Before the transfer,
the Inspector General of Fortifications was responsible for
the assignment, employment, instruction, discipline and
organization of Engineer officers. After the transfer, this
responsibility of course passed to the Commander in Chief.
The major point of contention among Engineer officers
64 Testimony of General Peel, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
, pp. 328-29.
65Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes, 1860 Report on
Military Organization, pp. 158-59.
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after the transfer was over the method of selection of their'
members for specific duties. The Horse Guards used a roster
system. In other words, selection was by turns and not neces-
sarily by ability, specialty or capability, which had formerly
been the criteria for selection. Burgoyne objected, as he
felt that a more capable officer for a specific task might
be bypassed in favor of a less capable one with resulting
confusion and inefficiency. The Duke of Cambridge defended
the roster system by referring to it as a hedge against
favoritism. He stated that he did not want the same officers
always to get the lucrative assignments while others got the
less agreeable ones; departure from the roster system should
be the exception, not the rule. Furthermore, the Duke of
Cambridge noted that assignments were referred to the Secre-
tary for War and through him presumably to the Inspector
General of Fortifications before they became final . The
ultimate decision in any case came from the Secretary for
67War.
The transfer of command to the Commander in Chief
had a very deleterious effect on the morale of the Corps of
Engineers, as the ultimate effect of the new arrangement
placed it under two masters. The Commander in Chief regulated
Engineer appointments, promotions and discipline but in the
area of civil works, their main function, they were responsible
66
Ibid.
, pp. 376-77
.
1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 242 and 247
67
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to the Secretary for War and indirectly through him to their'
former boss, the Inspector General of Fortifications. The
resulting dichotomy in the administration of the Engineers
created not only a dualism in the administration of the Army
as a whole but also in one of its military branches as well,
leaving Engineer officers confused, divided and demoralized.
This situation was illustrated by a statement in July, 1859,
by General Burgoyne in which he reported that he had received
"letters upon letters of condolence and regret on the part
of officers in the Engineers, that this change has been made."
The esprit de corps of the old Corps of Engineers gave way to
disharmony
,
especially in relations with the Horse Guards and
•4-4- 68its roster system.
Clothing
Up to June, 1854, the clothing of the Infantry and
Cavalry was supplied to each regiment by a clothier chosen
by the Colonel of the regiment, who paid for it out of a sum
allowed to him for that purpose. This method offered great
opportunities for individual abuse and financial benefit.
Consequently, a Royal Warrant signed in June, 1854, provided
that the Colonels would henceforth receive a fixed annual
allowance instead of "deriving any pecuniary emolument as
theretofore." It directed that the Colonels still provide
68 Ibid.
, pp. 242 (Burgoyne), 534 (Herbert) and 83
(Panmure)
.
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clothing and accoutrements, with the public paying only the '
cost price of the articles under regulations determined by
the Secretary at War. In June, 1855, the Colonels lost
their right to provide uniforms, which went to a new entity,
the Director General of Clothing. The Queen still determined
the patterns, through the Commander in Chief, and the public
now managed engagements already entered into by the Colonels.
For the future, the Government would purchase clothing after open
• • 69competition among prospective contractors.
A hitch soon developed, however. Different contractors
were hired to provide different materials which often resulted
in a delay in getting the clothing to the troops. For example,
buttons might be contracted from one person, cloth from another
and tape from a third. If delivery of buttons was late, coats
often went to regiments without them. General Peel altered
this system so that the War Office reverted back to the 'old
system 1 of contracting with one person for the entire article
of clothing. He stated that soon afterwards complaints dimin-
70
ished greatly 'and the quality of clothing improved.
Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into
the State of the Store and Clothing Depots at Weedon, WoolwichT
and the Tower, etc . (1859 [session 2], Vol. IX, p. 285), pp.
289-90. Hereinafter referred to as 1859 Store and Clothing .
In February, 1857, the Stores and Clothing Departments were
merged in order to simplify matters and avoid repetitious
procedures
.
70 1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 343.
The clothing of the Artillery and the Engineers was '
supplied in a different manner. Before 1856, it was furnished
entirely by contractors who supplied a portion of the clothing
made up (tailored) and a portion cut out but not made up.
Troops overseas received the made up clothing while those at
home got the cut out clothing which military tailors finished.
In May, 1856, a new system was adopted. After prior contracts
had expired, an establishment was formed at Woolwich Arsenal
(the headquarters for the Artillery and Engineers) for the
purpose of making up the clothing for both branches. Cloth
and all other required materials were procured by contract
71
and delivered there for assembly.
Unquestionably, the overall quality of all clothing
improved after these reforms . Not only Peel but also Lord
Panmure commented on this improvement as did a Parliamentary
Committee which, in 1859, reported on the clothing establish-
ment. The Committee found that the cloth used in artillery
and engineer clothing was "very much better" than that of pre-
1856, and that the clothing cost "considerably less" than
72
that supplied by contractors under the old, pre-1856 system.
The Committee also found that the quality of infantry and
cavalry clothing was much better albeit more expensive. Never-
theless, the Committee believed this increased quality and the
71 1859 Store and Clothing , p. 312.
72 Ibid.
,
p. 309. See also the testimony of Lord
Panmure, 1860 Report on Military Organizations, p. 96.
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opportunity for open competition for contracts outweighed
7 3the added cost.
In terms of quality, the new system was thus clearly
superior to the former one. In terms of efficiency, it was
no worse than its predecessor. In terms of economy, it
appears that the new system remained within tolerable bounds. 74
Armaments Manufacture
At the beginning of the Crimean War, manufacturing
at the government facilities at Woolwich Arsenal was on a
small scale, which resulted in a considerable deficiency of
ordnance stores. A great deal of what was available, further-
more, dated back to the time of the Napoleonic Wars. Much
of the difficulty owed to the lack of suitable machinery at
Woolwich to enable the Arsenal to keep up with demand. This
lack, along with the exorbitant demands made by private
manufacturers and the rapid drain of stores, led the govern-
ment to create, in Panmure * s words, "a vast establishment of
1859 Store and Clothing , p. 309. Both General Peel
and Lord Panmure contradicted the Committee's findings by
testifying that the cost of the new system approximated that
of the former one. Although statistics are not available to
support either contention, it can be surmised that the cost of
the new system must have approximated or just barely exceeded
the cost of the old system, since no complaints were raised
regarding it. Furthermore, Peel stated that he had seen compari-
sons and, when the increased cost of raw materials was added, the
two costs were "very nearly the same thing." ( 1860 Report on
Military Organization , pp. 96 and 343).
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In regard to efficiency, Lord Panmure stated that
deliveries of clothing were as punctual under the new system
as under the old one.' ( 1860 Report on Military Organization ,
p. 96).
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very complex and valuable machinery" on an extensive scale at
Woolwich. Machines procured from the United States and from
countries on the Continent enabled a powerful factory of
. . 75
munitions to emerge
.
By 1859 , there were three major manufacturing depart-
ments at Woolwich—the Gun Carriage Department, the Laboratory
and the Gun Factory—along with two other important departments
,
7 6the Chemical Department and the Stores Department . There
were two other branches as well : one at Enfield, for the
production of small arms, and the other at Waltham Abbey,
for the manufacture of gunpowder.
The Carriage Department, the largest department at
Woolwich, manufactured carriages, platforms, slides and mortar
beds for both land and sea service. The Laboratory produced
s
munitions, rockets and shells and the Gun Factory manufactured
Armstrong (rifled) guns and forged muzzle loading guns. The
Stores Department, under the supervision of the Director of
Stores and Clothing at the War Office, provided ordnance stores
and all military stores except small arms, camp equipment and
barrack stores to land and sea forces and to defenses at home
and abroad. The Chemical Department reported on all inventions
and proposals and questions of a chemical, generally scientific
75 1860 Report on Military Organizations , pp. 175 (Hawes)
and 87-89 (Panmure) . See also, Andrew Wynter, "Woolwich Arsenal
and its Manufacturing Establishments," London Quarterly Review,
January, 1858, p. 122.
76The Stores Department at Woolwich should not be
confused with the Stores and Clothing Department at the War
Office, a distinct entity altogether.
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nature (e.g., analysis of bread) supplied to the Army. 77
All authorizations for manufacture emanated from the
Stores and Clothing Department at the War Office, passed to
the Stores Department at Woolwich, and then to the appropriate
manufacturing department (s ) for action. A completed item
went to the Stores Department which issued it to the field
according to the instructions of the War Office. Thus, the
Stores Department was actually the pivotal entity at Woolwich
around which the other departments operated. 78
Despite the importance of the Woolwich establishment,
there was no one superintendent present there to oversee
operations. Lord Panmure defended this arrangement since he
believed a superintendent would probably interfere continually
in the work of the departments; more differences might arise
between the superintendent and the department heads than
79
among the department heads themselves. Consequently, in
matters of a financial nature, the department heads at Woolwich
looked to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Sir Benjamin
77 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 481 (Colonel
Alexander Thomas Tulloh, Head, Carriage Department) , 577 (Her-
bert) , 178 (Hawes) and 429 (Captain Henry William Gordon,
Principal Military Storekeeper, Woolwich). Also, Wynter,
"Woolwich Arsenal," p. 124 and 1859 Store and Clothing , p. 313.
Another distinct entity responsible for stores was located at
the Tower of London. Under the Director of Stores and Clothing
at the War Office, it provided accoutrements, camp equipment,
barrack bedding, furniture, utensils, tools of all descriptions
and small arms. ( 1859 Store and Clothing , pp. 319 and 321).
78Testimony of Gordon, 1860 Report on Military Organiza -
tion
, pp. 429 and 432 and 1859 Store and Clothing , pp. 313-14.
79 1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 91.
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Hawes. Sir Benjamin corresponded with each of them on financial
matters and held weekly meetings in his office to discuss
financial items, but this was as far as his supervisory
authority went. He exercised no discretion whatsoever over
technical matters, which were determined by consultation
between the departments and the Secretary for War through
the Stores and Clothing Department and/or the Ordnance Select
8 0Committee.
The purpose of the augmentation of the establishment
at Woolwich had been to obtain a "good and cheap supply of a
8
1
high standard as to quality." In this purpose, the establish-
ment succeeded. Sir Benjamin Hawes felt that the results of
the change in terms of the supply of stores to the Army in the
second year of the Crimean War and during the Indian mutiny
were satisfactory. The greatly increased power of production
had eliminated the danger of running short of armaments and
82
munitions
.
Hawes also stated that the new arrangement saved a
considerable amount of money. He supported his contention
80 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 183 (Godley)
,
536 and 540 (Herbert) , 486 and 494 (John Anderson, Assistant
Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich) and 44 0
(Major Edward M. Boxer, Head, Royal Laboratory, Woolwich).
81Statement by Mr. Monsell, a member of the Committee,
1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 175.
82 1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 175.
68
with figures indicating a saving of nearly L200, 000 in 1859-60
for the casting of a specified amount of shot and shells at
Woolwich over the cost paid to contractors in 1855 for identical
work. Major Boxer, the Head of the Laboratory at Woolwich,
confirmed Hawes' figures and indicated that although quality
did not improve (it had always been good) , the Laboratory
could produce any number of shell and shot at any given
moment. In itself, this ability to quickly produce ammuni-
8 3tion was a vast improvement over past capabilities.
Praise for the new system also came from the Assistant
Under Secretary of State, J.R. Godley, and from Sidney Herbert.
Herbert felt that the establishment, now eminently satisfactory,
had made up the arrears in guns and ammunition caused by the
Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. Praise for the new system
came in its early stages from no less a figure than Lord
Palmerston , the Prime Minister. In a letter to Panmure after
a visit to Woolwich in September, 1855, the Prime Minister
observed: "The state of the establishment does great credit
to your administration. You have some remarkably intelligent
men at the head of departments, and there is throughout a
spirit of activity and progress which is very gratifying to
„84
me
.
Notwithstanding this success, deficiencies remained.
83Ibid., pp. 177 and 444-45.
84Douglas and Ramsay, eds., Panmure Papers, II, p. 487.
Also, 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 184 (Godley)
and 538 (Herbert)
.
The most important was the lack of on-the-spot supervision '
by an overall commander/superintendent. Although the system
seemed to function well, the Government placed a great deal
of trust in the individual department heads at Woolwich to
perform efficiently and properly. In fact, the War Office
did not even officially delegate an artillery officer or
anyone else to inspect the Gun Factory or the distribution
of its products. Military and civil authorities often
visited unofficially to (in the words of John Anderson, the
Assistant Superintendent of the Gun Factory) "see how we were
getting on," but neither Sir Benjamin Hawes nor the Director
General of Stores and Clothing, Captain Caffin, the two
points of contact between Woolwich and the War Office,
8 5
visited the establishment with any regularity. This then wa
a potentially ticklish situation— if the department heads
lacked integrity or ability, possible abuse or, at worst,
disaster, might ensue.
This lack of overall supervision is especially sur-
prising in light of events at the clothing depot at Weedon.
Although it was located some distance from London, Panmure
had established the depot at Weedon in November, 1855, in
order to take advantage of existing buildings there. James
Sutton Elliot, a man of thirty five years' experience working
under the Board of Ordnance, took charge of the depot in
85Testimony of John Anderson, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
,
pp. 492-93.
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December, 1855, and remained there until May, 1858, after
which he fled to America. His successor subsequently found
the depot's books to be in arrears. It became necessary for
an outside accounting firm to examine them, which took eight
months. The firm concluded that Elliot was guilty of laxity
and irregularity in his bookkeeping, but not of fraudulent
practices or of cheating the government. Furthermore, it
discovered no pecuniary loss in consequence of Elliot's mis-
management of accounts.
A Parliamentary Committee subsequently found in 1859
that the fault for the unsatisfactory conduct of business at
the depot lay with the War Office, mainly because of a lack
of supervision . The Committee felt that the depot was located
too far from London for the immediate and personal surveil-
lance of the Director General of Stores and Clothing, Captain
Caff in, who had visited Weedon only once, in April, 1857, and
then had directed his attention only to the system of inspec-
tion of goods to the neglect of the books. General Peel even-
tually rectiffed this mistake during his tenure as Secretary
for War by moving the depot to Pimlico where more rigid super-
8 7
vision from London could be exercised.
86 1859 Store and Clothing , pp. 290-94 and 298.
87 Ibid., pp. 300 and 306-07.
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The Accountant General's Office
The Accountant General's Office, first constituted
in 1855, combined under one head the duties formerly dis-
charged by the Examiner of Accounts and the bookkeeping
branch at the War Office with that portion of the duties
of the Surveyor General of Ordnance which consisted of the
examination of claims and audit of accounts of the Ordnance
Corps and of the other establishments under the Board of
Ordnance. The Accountant General thus superintended the whole
of the accounting department including bookkeeping, examining
8 8
and payment functions.
War Office personnel and members of a Parliamentary
Committee which investigated the Accountant General's Office
found the overall performance of the new department satis-
8 9factory. Two major controversies, however, soon surfaced.
The first concerned the preparation of the Army Estimates
and the second concerned an operational assistant Accountant
General
.
Before the amalgamation of the War Office and the
88Testimony of George Arbuthnot, a Treasury employee and
a member of a Parliamentary Committee which looked into the
Accountant General's branch of the War Office, and Richard
Charles Kirby, the Accountant General, 1860 Report on Military
Organization
, pp. 396 and 412. See also 1864 War Office, p. 331.
Arbuthnot 's Committee presented its report in April, 1859.
89Testimony of Sir Benjamin Hawes , Arbuthnot, and William
George Anderson, a principle clerk of the finance branch of the
Treasury and a member of the Parliamentary Committee along with
Arbuthnot, 1860 Report on Military Organization, pp. 226 and 405.
Board of Ordnance, the expenditures of the War Office were '
confined mostly to pay and allowances, which made the prepa-
ration of the Estimates comparatively simple. On the other
hand, Ordnance Department expenditures covered a wide range
of activities, rendering accounting procedures and Estimates
more complicated. In the War Office, a department separate
from accounting prepared the Estimates, while in the Ordnance
Department, the account branch prepared the Estimates. Un-
fortunately, when the consolidation occurred, the old War
Office method was adopted for the reorganized War Office.
Consequently, a clerk under the direction of the Secretary for
*
War not connected with the Accountant General 1 s Department
prepared the Estimates. His was a critical job, for the
Estimates were the foundations of expenditure, for which the
Accountant General was responsible, and the record of that
expenditure formed the material for the annual accounts pre-
90
sented by the War Office to Parliament.
Unfortunately , under the new arrangement , the clerks
who recorded expenditures in the Accountant General's Depart-
ment were not necessarily acquainted with the classifications
established in the Estimates and were thus prone to error.
For example, when William Anderson inspected the Accountant
General's Department, he found seven pages of entries that had
to be corrected because the classifications did not conform to
90Testimony of Arbuthnot, 1860 Report on Military
Organization, pp. 390-91 and 398.
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those in the Estimates. Conversely, those people who pre-
'
pared the Estimates were not familiar with accounting classifi-
cations. The result was not unlike the confusion among account-
ing clerks over the Estimates. As George Arbuthnot stated,
all those intricate questions of expenditure which
would arise from works, stores and so on, very
much complicated the system of accounts, and it
has been found, in practice, that the clerk who
prepares the estimates, not having a knowledge of
the details of the expenditure, frequently so clas-
sifies the details of the estimates that it mis-
leads those who have direction of the expenditure.
Logically, the person who prepared the Estimates should also
have entered expenditures in accounts, a point Parliament and
the Army soon realized. Thus, in 1860, as the result of a
recommendation by Arbuthnot 's Committee, the Secretary for
War, Sidney Herbert, set in motion such a change. Thereafter,
the Accountant General framed the Estimates in addition to
92his other duties.
The second major controversy involved the position
of Assistant Accountant General. Formerly, in the War Office,
one person, the Chief Examiner, had conducted the examination
Ibid.
,
p. 391 and testimony of William Anderson,
1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 391. For example, if
bayonets were polished, they were considered in the accounts
as arms. If they were not polished, they came under the head
of miscellaneous stores. ( 1860 Report on Military Organiza -
tion
, p. 394) .
92 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 582 (Herbert)
and 39 3 (Arbuthnot) . The change was made official by a War
Office memorandum dated 24 June 1862. ( 1870 Report on the Army
Departments
,
pp. 394-95).
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of accounts. Under the new organization, this work was
undertaken by the Assistant Accountant General who replaced,
in great measure, the former Chief Examiner. The Assistant
Accountant General performed no other functions for the
93Accountant General. Thus, even though the position of
Chief Examiner no longer existed, in reality it continued
with only a change in its designation.
Parliament grew concerned over this situation, because
there seemed to be too much business in the department to be
effectively superintended by one person (the Accountant
94General ) without a general assistant. Several alternatives
were proposed, including an increase in duties for the
assistant but, as of 1860, the situation remained the same.
In conclusion, both major problems involved carry-
overs from the previous organization. In one case, the
situation was resolved by substituting one method for another.
In the other case, an expansion of duties was proposed in
order to satisfy Parliamentary concern over a possible lack
of supervision in a crucial department. The problems then
did not concern new positions and procedures, but the recon-
ciliation of former positions and procedures in view of the re-
organization.
93Testimony of William Anderson, 1860 Report on
Military Organization , p. 399.
94Testimony of Arbuthnot, 1860 Report on Military
Organization, p. 399.
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Commissariat
The much maligned Commissariat, unfortunately, after
the reorganization remained as much a center of dispute as
before because of indecision as to its financial functions
and insufficient field organization.
To reiterate, the Commissariat was transferred in its
entirety from the Treasury to the War Department in December,
1854. Its duties consisted of supplying food, fuel and light
to the Army at home and abroad and of examining store accounts,
returns and contracts dealing with commissariat supplies
.
It also entered into all local contracts overseas for supplies
,
so that only one department would bid for contracts, avoiding
the possibility of competitive bidding between departments
.
Each department abroad went through the Commissariat to ob-
tain items not in stock or available otherwise, and, with the
permission of the General Officer in Command at the particular
location, the Commissariat contracted for the items. The
transaction was actually only a paper one, however, as the
Commissariat had nothing to do with the issue, receipt or
inspection of goods. 96 Finally, the financial business of the
I860 Report on Military Organization, pp. 79 and 102
(Panmure) and 297 (John William Smith, the Commissary General).
Note that the so-called Quartermaster General's stores (i.e.,
camping equipment--tents , clothing, mining/entrenching tools-
blankets, boots, etc.) were entirely distinct from, and managed
separately from, commissariat supplies. (Testimony of Smith,
1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 278-79)
.
96Testimony of Admiral J.C. Caffin, Director General
of Stores, 1867 Report on Supply , p. 402. and testimony of Hawes,
I860 Report on Military Organization, p. 216.
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War Office overseas rested entirely with the Commissariat,
though domestically the management of financial matters fell
97to the Accountant General.
- In reality, the financial business of the Commissariat
was never completely divorced from the Treasury. As Lord
Panmure stated: "such is the complicated nature of the
Commissariat, that the Treasury had transactions with the
9£Commissariat ... in all parts of the world. And have still."
In fact, as explained by William T. Power, the Commissary
General in 1864, Commissariat officers actually served as
overseas agents for the Treas.ury in that they raised, through
the Treasury, all money for the Army and Navy overseas, made
monetary advances for every service overseas, and purchased
and paid for all supplies and materials obtained on the spot
overseas for all branches of the Army. Commissariat officers
were, in the words of Power, "in fact, the bankers of the army
and the agents of the Treasury and of the War Department
u a -99abroad.
Lord Panmure therefore soon became convinced of the
inexpediency of the transfer of the financial business of the
97 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 297 (Smith)
nd 412 (Richard Charles Kirby, the Accountant General).
98 1860 Report on Military Organization, p. 79.
1864 testimony
appendix
.
99 1867 Report on Supply , Appendix VI, p. 625. Power's
was included in this Committee's report as an
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Commissariat to the War Office from the Treasury. He felt it
an unnecessary and inconvenient burden on himself, the War
Office and the Commissariat. This feeling, along with Treasury
objections to the transfer, led Panmure to arrange for the
financial business to be retransferred back to the Treasury
in early 1856. 100
By the terms of the retransfer, the Treasury took
back the management and the correspondence attendant upon all
financial matters. However, it did not appoint its own
officers to supervise financial operations but continued to
employ Commissariat officers for that purpose because
Commissariat officers were the only trained people available. 101
Testifying before a Parliamentary Committee in 1864, Power
explained that the Treasury was
determined to retain the commissariat officers in
the service, expressing at the same time their satis-
faction with the manner in which they had always
discharged their trust, and their confidence in their
capacity and integrity. To this day the duty contin-
ues to be performed by the commissariat, accounting
direct to the Treasury, without any reference to the
Secretary, of State for War for this important
service .102
1860 Report on Military Organization , pp. 79-80.
The Treasury had objected on the grounds that the transfer
of financial business to the War Office included large trans-
actions with the colonies and other miscellaneous business
with which the War Office had nothing to do. (Testimony of
William Anderson, 1860 Report on Military Organization , pp.
410-11).
101 1864 War Office , p. 334. See also the testimony of
Lord Panmure, 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 80.
102 1867 Report on Supply, Appendix VI, p. 630.
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Therefore, officers of supply remained officers of finance
at the same time even though the primary duty of the Commis-
sariat was to provide food, fuel and light for the Army.
This situation presented an enormous difficulty to
Commissariat officers as they attempted to reconcile the
conflicting demands made upon them in the field in their
roles of finance and supply. During both the New Zealand and
China expeditions of the late 1850s and early 1860s, financial
difficulties arose because the principal Commissariat officers,
required to attend to supply duties, could not give personal
attention to the enforcement of financial regulations. To
add to their difficulties, these Commissariat officers often
found themselves serving under four masters: the Treasury,
the Secretary for War (through the
s
Accountant General) for
military payments and accounts, the Commissary General and
the military officer in command of their respective unit
10 3
or installation. In the words of Power:
There can be no doubt that for [Commissariat offi-
cers] . . t . there are too many responsibilities, too
many accounts, and too many masters. It is quite
impossible that they can give their whole or even
the necessary attention to all of these matters in
times of great pressure. 1 ^ 4
1031864 War Office , pp. 333-34 and John Bowie, The
Imperial Achievement: The Rise and Transformation of the British
Empire (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pp. 271 and
278-79.
1Q4 1867 Report on Supply , Appendix VI, p. 630. The
problem of a heavy workload for Commissariat officers was
illustrated by events during the Crimean War. At that time,
the Commissary General in the Crimea had become overburdened
with work and even with "a great deal of assistance, he had
been unable to carry out properly the double duty of supplying
79
The Commissariat's problems did not end there how- '
ever. Commissariat officers were civilians and, as such,
were subject to much criticism and ridicule from Army person-
nel in. the field. William H. Drake, the Commissary General
in 1866, dealt with this subject in testimony before a
Parliamentary Committee. He referred to it as an "inherent
weakness in any department to be entirely civil, and not to
have a cordial co-operation with all other departments." 105
Furthermore, Commissariat officers were often forced
to perform in the field without an adequate number of sub-
ordinates, thus increasing their workload and intensifying
the pressure upon them. In view of this problem, a committee
appointed by the Secretary for War in 1858 to inquire into the
Commissariat and its efficiency found "a feeling of great
depression and discouragement" in the department caused by
"the want of consideration in which they are held . . . and
of the helplessness and embarrassment in which they invariably
find themselves placed, when troops are ordered to the field,
from the absence of subordinate assistance." The committee
concluded that the Commissariat "cannot be considered at this
moment as in any respect in a more satisfactory condition for
the Army and raising funds to support it. He therefore had
of necessity delegated the latter function to a subordinate
officer at Constantinople. (Testimony of Sir John McNeill,
the head of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supplies of the
British Army in the Crimea, 1860 Report on Military Organiza-
tion, pp. 307 and 309).
105 1867 Report on Supply , p. 506. See also the
testimony of M'Neill, 1860 Report on Military Organization,
pp. 308-09.
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field service than it was found to be at the outbreak of the
last war." 106
The result of the committee's report was a Royal
Warrant issued in October, 1858, which gave a military
character to the Commissariat. The Warrant specified that
all first appointments in the Commissariat were to be made
from among commissioned officers of the Army, specifically
subalterns, who volunteered and who were recommended by their
commanders. At the end of a probationary period, if the
officers proved competent, they would receive commissions
in the Commissariat as Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals.
The Warrant also specified a table of equivalent ranks of
Commissariat and Army officers and it authorized the Commis-
sariat to draw subordinates (i . e. , clerks , storekeepers,
butchers, bakers, etc.) from among Army personnel on a
permanent basis if necessary. These individuals would be
completely withdrawn from their regiments after a probationary
period and placed under Commissariat officers for discipline.
1 06Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into
the Existing Organization of the Commissariat Department (18 59,
Vol. XV, p. 187) , p. 192 . Hereinafter referred to as 1859
Commissariat Department . The Committee's report was submitted
on July 27, 1858. See also the testimony of Commissary _ General
Smith, 1860 Report on Military Organization , p. 269, which
addresses the issue of a lack of subordinates.
107 1859 Commissary Department, pp. 189-90.
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The Commissariat was thus subject to much confusion
and turmoil in the years following the Crimean War. Even
though it became more military in character, in 1860 the
results had hardly begun to show as the scheme had not had
sufficient time to develop. The Commissariat thus remained
in a questionable state of efficiency. However, this is not
to say that the reorganization did not have at least some
positive effect on the Commissariat. Especially encouraging
was the move to correct one of the major difficulties
encountered in the Crimean War—the inability of soldiers to
help themselves in the supply of food. Under a new arrange-
ment after the reorganization, commissariat corps were estab-
lished at the several military camps in the United Kingdom
resulting in the creation of a body of trained men accustomed
108
to slaughter, bake and distribute food for a large force.
Conclusion
The War Office of 1860 differed substantially from
the one of 1854. Much larger, it had also assumed much more
responsibility and had moved to a different location. Instead
of being one of several agencies administering the Army, it
was now the only one. The Secretary for War had replaced the
various persons controlling the Army and representing the Army*
interest in Parliament.
The Army itself was unified under the Commander in
108Testimony of Smith, 18 60 Report on Military
Organization
,
p. 2 70.
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Chief instead of being fragmented as before. Of the two major
events which had brought this about, one, the transfer of the
command of the Artillery to the Commander in Chief, had
worked- well. However, the other major event, the transfer
of the command of the Engineers to the Commander in Chief,
had not worked well as it had placed the Engineers under two
masters which (along with other factors) resulted in the
demoralization of the corps.
Clothing was of a better quality and the government
was realizing a saving by manufacturing its own arms at Wool-
wich and elsewhere. Furthermore, by producing arms and muni-
tions at a much greater rate than before, the government had
effectively diminished its chances of being caught again with
a deficiency in armaments in case of war.
Finally, a much greater degree of unification of the
administrative elements of the Army now existed, though the
Horse Guards and, to a much lesser degree, the Medical
Department, still acted somewhat independently.
Unfortunately, the reorganization failed to solve
several past deficiencies and even created several new
problems. The most obvious past deficiency it failed to
correct was the dualism between the civil and military authori-
ties in the administration of the Army. In fact, the re-
organization emphasized and even perpetuated this dualism
by maintaining separate locations for the Commander in Chief
and the War Office, which accentuated the distinctness between
83
the two authorities. So, too, did the system of formal
correspondence between the two and the appointment at the
War Office of a special position, the Secretary for Military
Correspondence, to deal with the Horse Guards. The failure
of the administration to define precisely the relative
positions of the Secretary for War and the Commander in Chief
only enhanced this separation.
Another past deficiency not solved was that of the
Commissariat, which remained in a state of flux and confusion.
However, by giving the Commissariat a more military character,
the War Office laid the groundwork for improvement and
increased efficiency.
Much of what was done in the early stages of the
reorganization was done in a hasty . fashion and under tremendous
pressure. Problems resulted and mistakes were made because
of a lack of foresight by the reorganizers . Prime examples
were the transfer and subsequent retransfer of the financial
business of the Commissariat, the confusion in accounting
procedures and Estimates framing, the complexity of the
minuting and correspondence system and the use first of
multiple, then of single contractors for clothing. Further-
more, the reorganization did not provide for an on-the-spot
supervisor of the crucial manufacturing establishment at Wool-
wich .
In short, the reorganization was not the final answer
3 4
in the search for Army efficiency and unity of administration
but it was a definite improvement over the past and was a step
in the right direction toward the ultimate goal.
CHAPTER IV
CONFUSION AND CHANGE, 1861-1868
As a result of continuing problems in War Office
administration despite the wave of post-Crimean War reforms,
the organization of the War Office underwent numerous changes
during the period 1861-1868. The general pattern of change
was haphazard at best and reflected the uncertainty of War
Office administrators concerning organizational direction and
the lack of a concrete plan for further improvement of War
Office efficiency."'" It also reflected the waning of public
fervor following the initial phases of the Crimean War, so
that once again, the military and its reform became low
2
priority items in the public and parliamentary mind.
The major concern in this period revolved around
logistics and ordnance—two major problem areas in the Crimean
War which continued to be a thorn in the side of War Office
administrators long after the reorganization.
During the twelve year period following the reorgani-
zation of 1855, there were seventeen Royal Commissions, eighteen
select committees of the House of Commons, nineteen committees
of officers within the War Office and thirty-five committees
of military officers which investigated several aspects of War
Office and Horse Guards operations and organization in an
attempt to identify and eliminate sources of confusion, ambiguity
and inefficiency. (Fortescue, British Army , XIII, p. 555).
See Appendix D for a graphic depiction of War Office organization
as of 1867, along with a brief list of duties for major depart-
ments .
2 Bond, Staff College , pp. 82-83.
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Interestingly enough, the situation in the area of
civil-military relations in 1868 was basically the same as
in 1860. In fact, only one concrete attempt was made to
define further the duties of the Commander in Chief vis-a-vis
the Secretary for War. This occurred in March, 1869, in
answer to a question in the House of Commons relating to
documents "now in force" upon the subject of the respective
duties and authority of the Secretary for War and the Commander
in Chief. The Government responded with the publication of a
document dated 11 October 1861, issued "By Her Majesty's
Command." It stated,
Whereas We deem it expedient, in order to prevent
any doubts as to the powers and duties of the
Commander in Chief with respect to the Government
of Our Army and the Administration of Military
Affairs, to express Our Will and Pleasure thereon.
Now Our Will and Pleasure is, that the Military
Command and Discipline of Our Army and Land Forces,
as likewise the Appointments to and Promotions in
the same, together with all powers relating to the
Military Command and Discipline of Our Army, which,
under and by any Patent or Commission from Us,
shall have been, or shall from time to time be,
committed, to, vested in, or regulated by the
Commander, in Chief of Our Forces, or the General
Commanding Our Forces in Chief for the time being,
shall be excepted from the Department of the Sec-
retary of State for War.
And We are further pleased to declare Our Will and
Pleasure to be, that all powers relating to the
matters above enumerated shall be exercised, and
all business relating thereto shall be transacted
by the Commander in Chief of Our Forces for the
time being, and shall be deemed to belong to his
Office, subject always to Our General Control over
_
the Government of the Army, and to the responsibility
of the Secretary of State for the exercise of Our
Royal Prerogative in that behalf, and subject to
any powers formerly exercised by the Secretary at
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War.
This statement certainly did nothing to clear up
the vagueness relating to the respective duties and authority
of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary for War. It only
served to perpetuate the previous situation.
However, both military and civilian administrators
voiced concern over the segregation of the Horse Guards from
the War Office. A Parliamentary Committee appointed to
inquire into the conduct of business in the War Office con-
cluded in 1870 that the military administration of England
was organized upon a system of want of trust. The result
was the creation of a
double establishment for the transaction of the same
business . . . and both within the walls of the War
Office itself, and more especially between the War
Office and the Horse Guards, the habit is still to
prefer a system of unnecessary check, double labour,
and divided responsibility, to one of well-defined
^
responsibility, simplicity, and reasonable confidence.
The military themselves even realized the efficacy of
the combination of military and civil authorities in the same
building. Lieutenant General Lord William Paulet, the Adjutant
General, testified before the Committee that the conduct of
business between the War Office and the Horse Guards would
indeed be facilitated and time saved by bringing both under
3Copy of any Documents now in force upon the subject
o f the respective Duties and Authority of the Secretary of
State for War and the Commander in Chief (1868-69, Vol XXXVI,
p. 591) , p. 591.
4 1870 Report on the Army Departments , pp. 359-60.
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one roof, but he felt that the military and civil authorities
should be kept distinct. When asked why, he replied: "They
always have been distinct. In fact, I have never given the
question much of a thought." 5 The Duke of Cambridge also
felt that the transaction of business between the two branches
would be facilitated "very considerably" by their consolidation.
However, he qualified this opinion by stating that he thought
it would be "very desirable to arrange that the Military Com-
mand should be on one side of the present Horse Guards,
whilst the Secretary of State 1 s Office , with the Financial
Departments, should be on the other, with a general communica-
tion connecting the two offices, each having a separate
entrance . 11 ^
The Horse Guards thus saw the need for improved
efficiency in the conduct of their business with the War
Office and accepted the premise that consolidation under one
roof was the best answer. However, they remained conserva-
tive in their outlook toward the civilian element, and they were
not ready to sacrifice their relative independence and their
7
share of authority over the Army.
5 Ibid.
,
p. 405.
6 Ibid.
, p. 463.
7The most obvious personification of military con-
servatism in the mid to late nineteenth century was, of course,
the Duke of Cambridge. The Duke was of the 'old school and,
backed by the Queen, represented that viewpoint m his dealings
with civilian authorities. However, as Hamer points out, the
Duke should not be characterized "as an unbending conservative
opposed to the changing times, but as representative of the
officers of the army which he had been chosen to command. (Hamer,
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The field of logistics, however, was not as static
in that two major changes occurred. The first took place in
1863 when the clothing business was separated from the Stores
Department and became, once again, a distinct department under
the Director of Clothing. The more significant change came
in 1868 with the creation of the Control Department. This was
the direct result of the recommendation of a Parliamentary
Committee, chaired by Lord Strathnairn, which in 1866 had
investigated Army transport and supply.
Lord Strathnairn ' s Committee recommended specifically
the organization of a department to control the working of
g
all departments of supply and transport. The Secretary for
War, Sir John Somerset Pakington, adopted the recommendation
in full and, in 1868, the Control Department was organized.
It consisted of the former Commissariat, Purveyors, Contract,
9
Clothing, Barrack and Military Store Departments. The basic
Civil-Military Relations , p. 14. See also Giles St. Aubyn, The
Royal George, 1819-1904: The Life of H.R.H. Prince George Duke
of Cambridge [.New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964], pp. 121-22).
Within the Army itself, a split developed between traditionalists
(conservatives) and reformers (progressives) , led by Sir Garnet
Wolseley. While both sides agreed that the Army as a profession
had to be protected from unnecessary civilian interference, they
disagreed over such issues as regimental reorganization, education,
training, staff planning and purchase. This conflict, which
falls beyond the scope of this inquiry, was important in that,
according to Hamer, it reflected "fairly accurately the cross-
currents and conflicting influences of the late Victorian era
that were transforming the old British army into the new." (Hamer,
Civil-Military Relations, pp. x and 18). For further reading on
this conflict and its impact, see Hamer, Ibid., pp. 13-30.
8 1867 Report on Supply , p. 354.
9Biddulph, Lord Cardwell, p. 13. General supervision
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change, though, was merely in the chain of command. The duties
of the departments as they then existed (i.e., regulations, forms
of account and method of conducting business) continued in
force "precisely as at present. ""^
The following excerpt from the Committee's report
explains its rationale for recommending such a change:
The necessity [ for the administrative reorganization
of supply] is more imperative than formerly, that
dependence should not be placed upon exceptional
talent, or upon lavish expenditure to provide, at the
moment of action, all that may have been omitted
during peace in our administrative organization.
The Committee are not unaware of, and do not desire
to underrate the changes, the improvements in details,
and the extension of the Administrative Departments
which have been made in late years, and which have
provided large administrative resources, but they find
they are unconnected by any common system of organi-
zation or direction, such as should combine their
action and turn them to the best account. The abundant
material and the division of labour which thus already
exist in the separate Departments, afford means and
opportunity for providing for the establishments, and to
a certain extent, for the qualifications, essential to
each. This division of labour should continue to be
maintained, and should be carefully defined; but for
practical efficiency, it must be combined with unity
of direction and control. 11
The specific function of the Control Department, as
spelled out by the Strathnairn Committee, was the "direction
and control of all supply services in the field and in
garri-
son, with direct responsibility" to the Secretary for
War, and
of the manufacturing departments was al so transfer
red to the
Control Department. (Testimony of Colonel John M . Adye
Com
manding Officer, Depot Brigade, Woolwich, 1870 Report
on the
Army Departments, pp. 44 5 and 449).
10 1867 Report on Supply , p. 355.
i:L Ibid., p. 381
through local (Control) officers, to the General Officer
Commanding "for the completeness and efficiency of such
services
.
11
The head of the Control Department, the Chief Con-
troller, had, under the authority of the Secretary for War,
1
3
the entire direction and control of the department. Control
officers were attached to large garrisons overseas and to
camps and military districts in Great Britain and Ireland.
In the field, these officers were subordinate solely to the
General Officer Commanding and were held accountable for
supply at each particular location. They also acted as
advisers to the General Officer Commanding on all adminis-
14
trative questions relating to supply and finance. Further-
more, in case of war, Control officers would accompany the
15
troops into the field.
The basic principle of this change was to concentrate
responsibility under a single officer for all supply functions.
This would then allow the Secretary for War and the General
Officer Commanding the army in the field to communicate with
12 Ibid.
, p. 355.
13 Ibid. The Controller in Chief (Major General Sir
Henry Storks) was also appointed a Military Under Secretary of
State (Biddulph, Lord Cardwell , p. 13).
14Testimony of Commissary-General William T. Power,
a member of the Strathnairn Committee, 18 70 Report on the Army
Departments
,
p. 416.
15 1867 Report on Supply , p. 360.
16Testimony of Power, 1870 Report on the Army .Depart-
ments, p. 416.
only one person relating to supply instead of with several
officers as before, resulting in more unity of action and
17better efficiency in war.
The change also served the interest of economy because
,
with the new organization , the position of department head
1
8
of each department affected by the change would be abolished.
The Government also hoped that the new system would reduce
the enormous amount of correspondence at the War Office and
19
the resultant delays in the accomplishment of business.
The Government's hope was realized, in part, by 1869'
as there was a definite improvement and simplification in the
conduct of supply business even though the Control Department
had existed for only about a year and had not been universally
established throughout the Army. Before the establishment
of the Control Department, all stores requisitions went through
the Horse Guards, which checked and approved them, before they
were sent to the appropriate department (Stores, Barrack, etc.)
at the War Office for action. With the establishment of the
Control Department, however, troops in the field made direct
requisitions upon the Control Department, thus eliminating
this correspondence. The local Control officer then used his
own judgment on individual requisitions and their propriety
17 1867 Report on Supply , p. 355.
18 Ibid.
19Testimony of Major General Storks, 1867 Report on
Supply, p. 58 8.
in accordance with regulation and, if he approved them, he
authorized the local store officer to issue the stores . He
then sent a copy of the requisition to the War Office for
review. The result was that, in the words of William T. Power,
correspondence was "reduced to a minimum, communications [were]
made as direct as possible" and only the officers responsible
20for supply transactions were involved. This was an immense
improvement over the former system which had caused delay and
21had brought no real advantage to anyone.
Nonetheless, the Horse Guards were not particularly
happy with the new arrangement. The military saw it as yet
another assault upon its authority and influence and made this
clear to the Parliamentary Committee inquiring into the conduct
of business in the War Office. The Duke of Cambridge himself
told the Committee that he thought the Control Department
infringed "very much more upon the military branches than is
desirable" in that the Horse Guards were now kept out of the
channel of supply requisition. The result was that the
Commander in Chief was kept in ignorance of many subjects of
which he ought to be aware, and which had come to his atten-
tion before the change. The Duke asserted that the former
system of requisitioning supplies through the Horse Guards
20 1870 Report on the Army Departments , pp. 415 and 425
(testimony of Major General George Balfour, Assistant to the
Controller in Chief).
21 See the testimony of Power, 1870 Report on the
Army
Departments , p. 416.
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constituted a check on the War Office (especially the Stores
Department) in that any delays or irregularities came to the
immediate attention of the Horse Guards, who then made
inquiries to the War Office to correct them. The advent of
2 2the Control system eliminated this check.
The changes of this decade were by no means limited
to logistical matters. One change of note which occurred
early in this period was the appointment in July, 1861, of
a Director General of Ordnance who relieved the President of
the Ordnance Select Committee of his duties as adviser to the
Secretary for War on artillery and armaments, and who also took
23
general charge of the manufacturing departments.
The Director General of Ordnance was not situated at
Woolwich, though, and was responsible only for the expenditure
of the manufacturing departments.
24 As such, he served
principally as a middleman or buffer between the War Office
(more especially the Stores Department) and the manufacturing
22 1870 Report on the Army Departments , p. 464. The
Control Department was incorporated into the larger Supply
Department by the reorganization of 1870 (see Chapter V, below)
Thus, it is virtually impossible to accurately assess the
actual impact to the supply system, if any, of the loss of the
Horse Guards' check on requisitions because of the short dura
tion of the Control system.
23Biddulph, Lord Cardwell , p. 12.
24Testimony of Major General J. St. George, the
Director General of Ordnance, 1867 Report on Supply, p. 494.
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departments . ^ ^
There were three basic reasons why the Director General
of Ordnance did not reside at Woolwich and did not have more
responsibility relating to the manufacturing departments
.
First, the Treasury objected to such a move. The Treasury
was of course concerned with the expense of an additional
position at Woolwich and balked at an expansion of the super-
2 6intending staff there. Second, the manufacturing department
heads strenuously opposed the move. These factors, along
with the third, a tradition of solid performance and efficiency
under the existing system, led the Government to make no
27
attempt to alter further the situation at Woolwich.
The Director General of Ordnance himself, Major General
St. George, recognized the inadequacy of this arrangement
and correctly noted that the Woolwich Arsenal still acted
2 8
independently with no direct, overall supervisor. Further-
more, the Director of Stores and the Director General of
Ordnance were quite independent of each other except in respect
to the financial business of the manufacturing departments.
Moreover, while the manufacturing departments were nominally
under the Director General of Ordnance's direction relating
to manufactures, the Stores Department at Woolwich took
orders
25 Ibid p. 492. See also the testimony of Rear
Admiral J.C. Caffin, the Director of Stores, 1867 Report
on
Supply
,
p. 401.
26Testimony of St. George, 1867 Report on Supply, p.
492.
27 1870 Report on the Army Departments , p.
358.
28 1867 Report on Supply, p. 493.
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from the Director of Stores. The end result was that there
2 9was much confusion and delay over procedures.
Another major, non-logistical change involved the
Accountant General's Department. In 1864, the Secretary for
War appointed a committee to inquire into the establishment
of the War Office. After completing its work, the committee
reported, among other things, that the Accountant General's
Department was too large to be efficiently supervised by one
person. Furthermore, the committee found that, owing to this
lack of effective supervision, the work of examination of
accounts stood very much in arrears. It therefore recom-
mended that the existing department be separated into two
distinct departments, each controlled by an officer responsi-
ble to the Secretary for War. It suggested that one branch
handle preparation of the Estimates, the direction of payments
and the final record of accounts and the other the examination
and audit of accounts. The committee believed that such a
separation would allow for a simplification of business which
would in turn result in a reduction in the number of clerks
rr. .30
and in more effective supervision.
The Secretary for War followed the committee's recom-
mendation exactly and, in 1865, divided the Accountant General's
29Testimony of Caffin, 1867 Report on Supply , p. 401.
See also the testimony of St. George, 1867 Report on Supply,
pp. 4 92 and 4 94.
30 186 4 War Office , pp. 331-32 and testimony of Douglas
Galton, the Assistant Under Secretary of State, 1870 Report
on the Army Departments, p. 392.
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31Department into the Accounts and Audit Departments.
Unfortunately, the separation of functions did not
simplify business as much as its planners had hoped. In
December, 1869, John Maclean, first clerk, first section,
Audit Department, stated that the separation was "upon the
whole . . . not good" as it increased work considerably.
Instead of a reduction in the number of clerks, the division
required the employment of additional personnel. Earlier,
accounts and audits had been performed by the same people who
had had all the necessary information "at their fingers'
ends." However, after the separation, continued references
between the two departments were necessary, thus requiring
32
additional labor, delay and expense.
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the conduct of
business of the two departments, it seems apparent that
improved efficiency resulted because of increased supervi-
sion within each department over the separate functions of
account and audit. Along this line, Douglas Galton, the
Assistant Under Secretary of State, stated in May, 1869 , that
"The accounts have never been in so forward a state
as they
31 1870 Report on the Army Departments , pp. 353
and 371.
32 Ibid pp. 460-61. William Henry White, a first
class
clerk in the Account Department, echoed Maclean's
opinion.
(1870 Report on the Army Departments , pp. 458-59).
account
the increased expense and the failure o
theseparation to
simplify the conduct of business. ( 18 70 Report
on tne army
Departments , p. 386)
.
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33
now are." Furthermore, both Galton and John Milton, the
Assistant Accountant General, thought the state of the audit
of accounts more satisfactory than it had been before in that
all arrears had been erased,^
Thus , the Accounts and Audit Departments presented
a paradox: the division of the Accountant General's functions
into two separate departments had wrought increased expense
and new hardships upon the clerks, but it had also resulted
in increased efficiency of output. The problem therefore
remained to reconcile, if possible, the increased efficiency
with improved working arrangements within and between the
departments
.
In addition to the major changes in War Office organi-
zation, several aspects of War Office operations during the
decade were significant in that they represented major problem
areas which had evolved shortly after the reorganization of
1855 and remained unresolved in 1868. The first of these
was the problem of massive amounts of correspondence which
continued to plague the War Office. In 1869, there was a
slight, drop from 1859 figures in the daily average number of
letters received at the War Office but it was insignificant
in
terms of work saved. Delays and unnecessary minuting
continued
33 187 0 Report on the Army Departments , p. 391.
34 Ibid.
,
pp. 392-93.
3 5
unabated.
The physical structure of the War Office in Pall Mall
itself caused much of the delay in the accomplishment of
business. As the business of the War Office had expanded
after its move to Pall Mall in 1858, neighboring houses had
been incorporated into the existing structure until the War
Office became, in the words of historian W.S. Hamer, "a
veritable rabbit-warren of rooms and corridors." Eventually,
nineteen houses came to be occupied by War Office officials
and clerks who labored in approximately 300 separate rooms.
This arrangement necessitated the employment of 150 messengers
3 6
solely for the purpose of inter-departmental communication.
Another significant aspect was the situation of the
Royal Engineers which remained the same (serving two masters)
despite an attempt in 1862 to remedy it. This attempt
involved the elimination of the position of Inspector General
of Fortifications and, in its place, the appointment of an
37
Inspector General of Engineers and Director of Works.
In his function of Director of Works, the Inspector
General came under the direct control of the Secretary for War
35Testimony of Ralph Thompson, who was in charge of
the Reqistry of correspondence at the War Office, 1870 Report
on the Army Departments, p. 462. See also the testimony of
St^rksTa former" Secretary for Military Correspondence, 1867
Report on Supply, p. 588.
36 Hame r, Civil-Military Relations, p. 8.
37Testimony of Colonel W.F.D. Jervois, a member of
the Royal Engineers since 18 39, 1870 Report on the
Army Depart-
ments, p. 430.
100
The Director of Works was the head of the new Works Depart-
ment which became responsible for the construction of forti-
fications and barracks, including their planning. 38 In
addition, certain other duties of the former Inspector General
of Fortifications went to a Royal Engineer officer who
became the Superintendent of the Barrack Department. This
new department was responsible for barrack services (water,
3 9gas, \etc.) and for barrack furniture and bedding.
In his function of Inspector General of Engineers,
the Inspector General was a consultant on the employment of
engineer officers. The Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Engin-
eers, remained responsible for this function, however, and
merely forwarded his recommendations through the Inspector
General of Engineers to the Commander in Chief and the Sec-
retary for War. This change did avoid some of the past com-
plications but it did not place responsibility for the dis-
tribution of engineer officers under the same individual
responsible for the execution of works. 40 The result was that,
as Major General Sir Lintorn Simmons, Royal Engineers, stated
in December, 1869, "there is considerable probability of the
38Return showing the Distribution of the Duties of all
Offices now consolidated under the Secretary for War (1867, Vol
XLI, p. 825), p. 830. Hereinafter referred to as 1867 Distri
-
bution of Duties . Also, testimony of Major Arthur Leahy,
Royal Engineers, 18 67 Report on Supply , p. 529 and Biddulph,
Lord Cardwell, p. 12.
39 1867 Distribution of Duties, p. 830.
40 1870 Report on the Army Departments, pp. 430 (Jervois)
and 4 37 (statement by Lord Northbrook, Chairman of the Committee)
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corps not being utilized to the greatest advantage." 41
The final aspect was the situation of the Commissariat.
It remained in a state of confusion without much noticeable
improvement in efficiency.
Many people felt a very real concern in this decade
over the fact that the Commissariat was critically short of
officer personnel, despite its new military character.
According to Commissary-General William H. Drake, the Commis-
sariat had no reserve forces except those personnel stationed
in England. Thus, if England became involved in a major war,
the system at home would have to be broken up in order to pro-
42
vide a supply of officers for field duty overseas. In fact,
during the fighting in New Zealand, the Commissariat had had
to borrow officers from the line and use civilians "of every
43
possible class" to fill its ranks.
The reason for the shortage in personnel was the
traditional one—economics. As far back as January, 1857,
the Duke of Cambridge had tried to impress upon the Government
the need to train more men for the Commissariat, but, despite
the lessons of the Crimean War, Lord Panmure had turned him
41 1870 Report on the Army Departments , p. 437. This
opinion was echoed by Colonel Murray, the Deputy Director of
Works for Barracks, who felt, like Simmons, that the
state o.
the administrative apparatus of the Royal Engineers
^un-
satisfactory because of the lack of a single head. ( 1870
Report
on the Army Departments , p. 440).
42 1867 Report on Supply , p. 506.
43Testimony of Drake, 1867 Report on Supply, p. 508.
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down in the interests of economy. "'The supplies of the Army
will have to be obtained in the most economical manner,'" Pan-
mure told the Duke, "'in order to keep John Bull in a good
44humour . '
"
Furthermore, the definition of the Commissariat's
duties seemed to become more complex and confused as time
went on. Besides the issue of the use of Commissariat offi-
cers for financial functions overseas, the Commissariat was
also faced with the fact that its officers at home did not
receive or issue fuel, light and straw like their counterparts
abroad, they only contracted for them. They also had nothing
to do with finances as this was a function of the War Office
through the Accountant General.
45 Deputy Commissary-General
E.B. Fonblanque aptly summed up this situation when he stated
to the Strathnairn Committee that "The great mischief of our
service is that we have one system for home service and another
for foreign service; and when we take the field both systems
are immediately abandoned, and a new one is improvised for the
„46 "
occasion
.
In conclusion, the overall confusion and piecemeal
44
St. Aubyn, Royal George , p. 120
45Testimony of William T. Power, the Commissary-General
in 1864, 186 7 Report on Supply , Appendix VI, p. 626.
See also
the testimony of Drake, lagpgport on Supply, p. 506.
46 1867 Report on Supply, p. 541.
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reform system of the immediate post-Crimean War and post-re-'
organization years continued for another decade. Several
major organizational changes were made, the most important
being the establishment of the Control Department, which
reflected a general concern by War Office administrators and
by Parliament over the quality of supervision both over and
within the various departments. The situation of the Account-
ant General's Department was an example of the concern for
more supervision within a department while the creation of
the Control Department reflected a desire for increased super-
vision over several departments. The creation of the Control
Department also reflected a move toward more administrative
unity within the War Office itself, so as to forestall poten-
tial problems in case of war and provide for a simplification
of business. It also represented another intrusion by the
civil element into Horse Guards' affairs. The most important
aspect of the new department, though, was that it further
enhanced the trend toward increased War Office unity begun by
t
Lord Panmure in 1855.
CHAPTER V
FINAL WORDS
The period 1855-68 was one of turbulence, confusion
and uncertainty in Army administration . It reflected quite
clearly the prevailing attitude of the time— from public
indignation over the condition of the Army and concern over
its initial lack of success in the Crimea, to a return of
public complacency about the military situation. Lacking an
overall, co-ordinated plan, the Government and War Office
administrators tried to effect needed improvements in effi-
ciency and organization and, to a great extent, they succeede
Panmure and his successors altered and refined his original
measures throughout the period in a search for the proper
combination. Without a doubt, the final product was a dis-
tinct improvement over the pre-Crimean War situation. How-
ever, it was by no means perfect and still posed several
problems to War Office authorities.
In December, 1868, Edward Cardwell succeeded Sir
John Pakington as Secretary of State for War and served in
that position until 1874. During this time, Cardwell under-
took a major reorganization of the War Office and abolished
purchase and long service. For the latter two actions,
he
won enduring notoriety because, in the words of J.W.
Fortes-
cue, "therewith the knell of the old British Army
was
104
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rung." 1 Other historians have gone further and considered
Cardwell the progenitor of War Office reform. This assumption
is totally in error. Although Cardwell provided the strong
administrative hand necessary to effect needed reform within
the Army, he certainly did not provide the original impetus
for reform of the War Office. His War Office Act of 1870
simply continued the process begun by Lord Panmure in 1855--
that of unifying Army administration in the War Office. By
reorganizing it into three main branches—Supply Department
(basically the Control Department)
,
Military Department and
Finance Department—and by moving the Commander in Chief to
Pall Mall, Cardwell merely carried War Office unity one step
further than his predecessors.
Cardwell 's reorganization of 1870 was followed by
major reorganizations in 1887-88, 1895 and 1904. The major
theme of each, beginning with that of 1855, was the integra-
tion of civilian power with professional military knowledge.
Each successive reorganization attempted to improve upon
its predecessor and create a system whereby the civilians
who were steadily gaining power and authority over the Army
would receive the necessary knowledge to administer it
1Fortescue, British Army , XIII, p. 560.
2John Gooch, for example, stated that "The advent of
Edward Cardwell as Secretary of State for War in 1868 heralded
a period of some thirty-four years of attempts at reforming the
War Office." (Gooch, Plans of War, pp. 3-4).
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effectively.
The reorganization of 1887-88 divided the War Office
into two divisions—Military and Civil—with all the principal
departments except finance and manufacture united under the
Commander in Chief. Thus, for the first time since the
eighteenth century, supply and operations were completely the
responsibility of the military. A great burden was therefore
placed on the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary for War
was left with only two official advisers. This reorganization
also furthered dualism in control in that it clearly divided
4
responsibility between the military and civil elements.
The reorganization of 1895 came on the heels of the
resignation of the Duke of Cambridge. With him out of the way,
the Government diminished the authority and responsibility of
the Commander in Chief. Five great military officers, instead
of one, were now established within the War Office: the Commander
in Chief (who acted as chief adviser to the Secretary for War
and had general command of all forces) , the Adjutant General
(who directed' recruiting, discipline and training), the
Inspector General of Fortifications (who was responsible for
barracks, fortifications and lands), the Quartermaster General
(who administered food, forage, quartering and lands) and the
Director General of Ordnance (who had charge of military stores)
.
3Hamer, Civil-Military Relations , p. xi.
4 Ibid.
, pp. 129-30 and Gordon, The War Office ,
pp. 67-68.
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The Commander in Chief had general supervision over the other
four but each was directly responsible to the Secretary for
War. The Commander in Chief thus lacked real control. Further-
more, the clear division of responsibility between the military
and the civilian authorities established by the reorganiza-
5tion of 1887-88 became blurred.
While the reorganization of 1855 first attempted to
integrate civilian power with military knowledge, the re-
organization of 1904 ultimately realized this goal, the even-
tual result of the multiple reorganizations of the War Office.
In 1904, the Army Council was established under the Secretary
for War and the General Staff concept was introduced into
the British Army.
The Army Council had as its mission the determination
of all questions of military policy. It consisted of three
civilian members (the Secretary for War [who was the Council's
president] , the Parliamentary Under Secretary and the Financial
Secretary) and four military members (the Adjutant General
[personnel], the Quartermaster General [supply], the Master
General of Ordnance [ordnance] and, after 1909, the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff) . The Council concept ensured that
the Secretary for War would be provided with the best pro-
fessional military opinion. It also divided policy making
from administration in that each member of the Council
was now
5Hamer, ri vi 1 -Military Relations , p. 167 and
Gordon,
The War Office , pp. 70-71. There was no change in
the office
of Financial Secretary.
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assisted by a Director who was responsible for the adminis-
trative duties of his department. 6
In addition, the reorganisation of 1904 eliminated
the position of Commander in Chief as an anachronism which
had outlived its usefulness and which had become too burden-
some for one man to handle effectively . Command of troops
went to generals located outside the War Office; thus, the
command function was removed from that of policy making. No
professional head of the Army was left who could now compete
7
with the Secretary for War for control of the Army.
The reorganization of 1904 established complete
unity and effectively absorbed the military elements into
War Office administration. The Secretary for War now pos-
O
sessed complete authority. Thus did Lord Panmure's pioneer
attempts at unification reach their fruition forty-nine years
later.
^Hamer
,
Civil-Military Relations
,
P. 235 and Gordon
,
The War Office pp. 79-80.
7 1Hamer Civil-Military Relations P. 235 and Gordon
The War Office
,
pp. 80-82.
8 TIHamer Civil-Military Relations
,
P. 235 and Gordon,
The War Office pp. 81-82.
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